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GRADUAL MARRIAGE
by
Jessica Feinberg∗
The time has come to reform the law governing marriage. In
determining the rights and obligations between spouses arising from
marriage, current law does not adequately account for the way in which
spousal behaviors and expectations change over the course of a
marriage. With regard to intact marriages, under the existing legal
framework, the spousal rights and obligations enjoyed by couples in
intact marriages arise all at once—at the moment a couple is
granted a marriage license—and do not change as the years of
marriage pass or as children are born to the marriage. In terms of
dissolving marriages, with few exceptions, all marriages are subject
to the same broad, default rules for determining post-dissolution
spousal rights and obligations without regard to the length of the
marriage or the presence of children within the marriage. Moreover,
the substantial discretion granted to judges in the maritaldissolution context often leads to unpredictable and inconsistent
results. Perhaps as a result of the law’s problematic approach to
determining spousal rights and obligations, marriage rates
have declined significantly over the past several decades and the
institution of marriage has come to occupy an increasingly perilous
place in U.S. society. This
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Article sets forth a comprehensive proposal for an improved legal
framework governing marriage that is based upon the concept of spousal
rights and obligations arising gradually over the course of a marriage.
Under the proposed system, various marriage levels would be established,
each providing a package of spousal rights and obligations tailored to
marriages that have reached that particular level under the default rules.
Ascension among the levels would be based primarily upon the length of
the marriage and the presence of children within the marriage, factors
that play a strong role in shaping spousal conduct and expectations.
Implementation of the proposal would result in a significantly improved
legal framework governing marriage.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider two marriages that exist in the same jurisdiction. Couple
number one will remain married for only two years and will not have any
children. Their divorce will occur when one of the spouses comes to the
realization that she and her spouse disagree on many of the essential
components of a shared life and, as a result, are completely incompatible
as long-term partners. Couple number two will remain married for thirty
years, during which time they will raise two children and make countless
decisions about their lives, careers, and finances based upon the overall
well-being of their family unit. Their divorce will occur when the spouses
reach the mutual conclusion that they have fallen out of love. The two
couples described above may appear to be in very different situations
with regard to the important characteristics of their marriages, but when
it comes to the marriage-based rights and obligations arising between the
spouses, the laws governing their marriages while the marriages are intact, as well as the laws governing their eventual divorces, will be largely
the same for each couple. More specifically, the package of spousal rights
and obligations that will govern the first year of couple number one’s intact marriage is almost exactly the same as the package of spousal rights
and obligations that will govern the 29th year of couple number two’s in1
tact marriage. Moreover, the default legal regime that will determine the
spousal rights and obligations arising from couple number one’s divorce
is largely the same as the default legal regime that will determine the
2
spousal rights and obligations arising from couple number two’s divorce.
Currently, the vast majority of the rights and protections that accompany intact marriages are not gradual, meaning that when a couple
takes the fifteen or so minutes necessary to apply for a marriage license,
and it is subsequently granted by the state, the couple automatically receives a package of state and federal rights and protections that, with few
3
exceptions, does not change over the course of the intact marriage.
Consequently, as members of an intact marriage, the couple will enjoy
the same spousal rights and protections whether they have been married
for one year or 30 years and whether they have children or not. At divorce or the death of one of the spouses, with few exceptions, the same
default legal scheme will determine the spousal rights and obligations
that stem from the marital dissolution, regardless of whether the couple
in question was married for one year or 50 years, and regardless of

1
2
3

See infra notes 56–66 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 67–86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 56–66 and accompanying text.
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whether the couple has children. Granted, the laws regarding at least
some dissolution-related spousal rights and obligations, such as spousal
support and property distribution, likely will provide for the court’s consideration factors such as length of the marriage and presence of children within the marriage, along with a long list of other factors, but these
laws generally will not instruct the court in any way with regard to how to
5
weigh or apply the various factors. Decisions regarding these rights and
6
obligations will be left completely within the court’s discretion.
Perhaps in part as a result of the problems within the legal framework governing marriage, in recent years the institution of marriage has
come to occupy an increasingly uncertain position in United States society. Marriage rates have decreased substantially over the past several decades, with marital households now comprising less than half of all house7
holds in the United States. Accompanying the decline in marriage rates
has been the drastic increase in non-marital cohabitation and births outside of marriage. Between 1960 and 2000, the number of cohabiting opposite-sex couples rose from approximately 500,000 to almost five million, and since then the rate of non-marital cohabitation has continued
8
its rapid rise. The rate of births outside of marriage has also increased
9
steadily, with 41% of all births currently occurring outside of marriage,
and births among cohabiting couples accounting for a substantial por10
tion of the rising non-marital birth rate. At the same time, the divorce
rate in the United States has stayed consistently high, holding steady at
11
around 40% to 50% in recent years.
It is time to reform the legal framework governing marriage in order
to address the problems currently faced by the institution. There are a
number of core goals that an improved legal framework governing marriage should seek to further. An important initial goal should be to provide more people with rights and protections for their relationships,
something which has become a significant problem with the decline of
marriage in recent years. In addition, an improved framework should
seek to help couples determine if marriage is the right choice for their
relationships, and should aim to filter well-suited relationships into the
institution of marriage. Supporting and stabilizing intact marriages to the
4

See infra notes 67–85 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
6
Id.
7
Jessica R. Feinberg, The Survival of Non-Marital Relationship Statuses in the SameSex Marriage Era: A Proposal, 87 Temp. L. Rev. 45, 46 (2014).
8
Id.
9
Jason DeParle & Sabrina Tavernise, Unwed Mothers Now a Majority Before Age of
30, N.Y. Times (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/us/forwomen-under-30-most-births-occur-outside-marriage.html?_r=0.
10
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 46.
11
Id. at 59.
5
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greatest extent possible, encouraging the continuation of healthy marriages, and facilitating the termination of unhealthy marriages are also
important goals. Finally, it is essential that the improved legal framework
governing marriage seeks to provide greater fairness, consistency, and
predictability in the context of the rights and obligations arising from
marital dissolution.
This Article sets forth a comprehensive proposal for an improved legal framework governing marriage that is based upon the concept of
spousal rights and obligations arising gradually over the course of the
marriage. More specifically, this Article proposes that the legal framework governing marriage should identify multiple levels of marriage, and
spousal rights and obligations should differ depending on the marriage
level. Ascension among the levels would be based primarily upon the
length of the marriage and the presence of children within the marriage,
factors that play a strong role in shaping spousal conduct and expectations. The first level under the proposed system would provide couples
with the opportunity to receive important, relevant rights and protections
in a low-risk, supportive setting while the couple determines if marriage is
right for their relationship. Each additional level would provide a package of rights and obligations tailored to spouses who have reached that
level, with the rights and obligations generally becoming more significant
with each marriage level. Judicial discretion in altering the default spousal rights and obligations applicable to a couple’s marriage level would be
limited, thereby providing more fairness, predictability, and efficiency in
the context of marital dissolution. Recognizing that there will be some
marriages in which expectations differ from that which generally would
be expected based upon the length of the marriage and the presence of
children within the marriage, couples would have the flexibility to optout of the default level applicable to them if they determined that the
level was ill-suited at the time for their particular relationship.
This Article is organized in the following manner. Section I provides
an overview of the current state of marriage, divorce, and cohabitation
12
within the United States. Section II analyzes the limitations of the current legal framework governing marriage, addressing the problems within the framework with regard to both intact marriages and dissolving
13
marriages. Section III identifies and explains the goals that an improved
14
legal framework governing marriage should seek to further. Section IV
sets forth an innovative and comprehensive proposal for an improved legal framework governing marriage that is based upon the gradual accrual
15
of spousal rights and obligations over the course of a marriage. Finally,

12
13
14
15

See infra Section I.
See infra Section II.
See infra Section III.
See infra Section IV.
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Section V explains how implementation of the proposal would further
the goals identified in Section III and addresses the concerns most likely
16
to arise with regard to the proposed framework.
I. MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND COHABITATION IN THE UNITED
STATES TODAY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. Marriage
The place of marriage within the societal landscape of the United
States has been in flux in recent decades, and its future has become unclear. The proportion of marital households in the United States has decreased significantly since 1950, when married couples made up 78% of
17
all households. In 2010, the Census Bureau reported that, for the first
time ever, less than half of all United States households were marital
18
households. In addition, barely over half of all adults are currently mar19
ried, which also represents an all-time low. The decline in marriage is
pervasive and is not confined to one group of individuals, as “[m]arriage
rates have dropped among all major racial/ethnic groups and for both
20
men and women.” The percentage of households consisting of a married couple and their minor children has also declined significantly in
21
recent years. In 1970, 40% of all households consisted of married cou22
23
ples with minor children. By 2012, that number had fallen to 20%.
Meanwhile, the percentage of births that occur outside of marriage has
24
climbed to 41%. Overall, marriage’s place within United States society
has changed drastically in recent decades, and, perhaps unsurprisingly,

16

See infra Section V.
Sabrina Tavernise, Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority, Census Finds, N.Y.
Times (May 26, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/us/26marry.html.
18
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 59.
19
Id.
20
Diana Lavery & Mark Mather, In U.S., Proportion Married at Lowest Recorded
Levels, Population Reference Bureau (Sept. 2010), http://www.prb.org/Articles/
2010/usmarriagedecline.aspx. However, there are significant class-based differences
in the context of entering marriage, with the decline in marriage sharpest among
low-income individuals. See Trevor Butterworth, What’s Behind the US Decline in
Marriage? Pragmatism, Forbes (June 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
trevorbutterworth/2013/06/25/whats-behind-the-us-decline-in-marriage-pragmatism/;
Pew Research Ctr.,The Decline of Marriage And Rise of New Families, at i
(2010), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-andrise-of-new-families/.
21
U.S. Census Bureau, Pub. No. 20-570, America’s Families and Living
Arrangements: 2012 1 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-570.pdf.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 59.
17
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approximately four out of ten Americans currently espouse the belief
25
that marriage is becoming obsolete.
B. Divorce
Despite the extensive changes to the overall marital landscape, the
divorce rate has not changed significantly in recent years, consistently
26
hovering somewhere between 40% and 50%. There is significant diversity, however, with regard to the duration of marriages that are disrupted
by divorce or legal separation. The median length of a first marriage is
27
approximately eight years. The rate of marital disruption is highest dur28
ing the early years of marriage. Approximately 20% of all first marriages
will be disrupted by divorce or legal separation before five years have
29
passed. In terms of divorces and legal separations that occur after the
fifth year of marriage, 13% of first marriages will be disrupted between
the fifth and tenth years of marriage, 10% of first marriages will be disrupted between the tenth and fifteenth years of marriage, and 7% of first
marriages will be disrupted at some point after the fifteenth year of mar30
riage. These numbers indicate that while the highest risk of marital disruption occurs during the early years of marriage, approximately 35% of
31
all marital disruptions will occur after ten years of marriage have passed.
Moreover, with the average life expectancy continuing to rise, it is likely
that the number of long-term marriages that end in divorce or legal sep32
aration will continue to increase.
In addition to the diversity among marriages that end in divorce or
legal separation with regard to relationship duration, there is also signifi25

D’Vera Cohn, Marriage Rate Declines and Marriage Age Rises, Pew Res. Ctr. (Dec.
14, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/14/marriage-rate-declines-andmarriage-age-rises/.
26
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 59.
27
Rose M. Kreider, U.S. Census Bureau, Pub. No. 70-97, Current Population
Reports: Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 2001 9
(2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p70-97.pdf. The median length of
disrupted marriages before legal separation is seven years. Id.
28
Alan J. Hawkins, Will Legislation to Encourage Premarital Education Strengthen
Marriage and Reduce Divorce?, 9 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 79, 87–88 (2007).
29
Catherine Bigelow, Marriage, American-Style / The Modern Prenup: Who Gets Them
and Who Needs Them, SFGate (Jan. 19, 2003), http://www.sfgate.com/style/bigelow/
article/Marriage-American-Style-The-modern-prenup-Who-2678711.php.
30
Katharine K. Baker, The Problem with Unpaid Work, 4 U. St. Thomas L.J. 599, 616
n.101 (2007) (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Advance Data No.
323, First Marriage Dissolution, Divorce, and Remarriage: United States 5
(2001), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad323.pdf).
31
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 30.
32
Stephanie Chen, Why Call It Quits After Decades of Marriage?, CNN (June 2,
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/06/02/al.gore.separation.40years.marriage/
index.html.
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cant diversity with regard to the existence of children within such mar33
riages. For example, it is estimated that approximately half of all divorc34
es involve children who are under the age of 18. This means that the
remaining half of all divorces either occur before children are born to
the marriage or after children born to the marriage reach the age of 18
(the latter situation presumably occurring far less often given that only
35
7% of first marriages dissolve after more than 15 years). Thus, while the
divorce rate has remained relatively consistent in recent years, the characteristics of dissolving marital relationships vary dramatically.
C. Cohabitation
Accompanying the decline in marriage and the consistently high divorce rate in the United States in recent decades has been the substantial
36
rise in non-marital cohabitation. The number of cohabiting oppositesex couples increased drastically between 1960 and 2000, rising from ap37
proximately 500,000 to almost 5,000,000. Since 2000, the number of
cohabiting couples has continued to rise, growing by almost 40% between 2000 and 2008, and by an additional 13% between 2008 and
38
2010. It is currently estimated that there are approximately eight mil39
lion cohabiting couples in the United States. Moreover, researchers
40
predict that the number of cohabiting couples will continue to increase.

33

Although researchers disagree with regard to the exact numbers, it is
estimated that a substantial percentage of divorces are among childless couples. Vicki
Larson, Are Childless Couples Headed Toward Divorce?, Huffington Post (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/vicki-larson/are-childfree-couples-doo_b_913051.
html (citing the statistic that “of the divorced couples in the United States, 66 percent

are childless compared with 40 percent who have kids”); Molly J. Walker Wilson, An
Evolutionary Perspective on Male Domestic Violence: Practical and Policy Implications, 32 Am.
J. Crim. L. 291, 315 (2005) (stating that of the four out of ten marriages that end in
divorce, half of them will have produced children by the time of the divorce); Andrea
Whatcott, Childless Couples Still Divorce at a Much Higher Rate than Those with Children,
Deseret News (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700169249/
Childless-couples-still-divorce-at-a-much-higher-rate-than-those-with-children.html
(“About 66 percent of American divorced couples are childless.”).
34
Rebecca Love Kourlis, It Is Just Good Business: The Case for Supporting Reform in
Divorce Court, 50 Fam. Ct. Rev. 549, 553 (2012).
35
See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 30.
36
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 59.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Bryan Strong, Christine DeVault, & Theodore F. Cohen, The Marriage
and Family Experience: Intimate Relationships in a Changing Society 77 (12th
ed. 2014).
40
Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 1, 34 (2007).
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As the number of cohabiting couples continues to rise, the average
length of cohabitation is increasing as well. The average length of time
that an individual cohabited with a non-marital significant other was 13
41
months in 1995. By 2006–2010, the average duration of cohabitation
42
had risen to almost two years. At the three-year mark of their cohabitation, 40% of cohabiting couples will have married, 27% of cohabiting
couples will have dissolved their relationships, and 32% of cohabiting
43
couples will still be cohabiting without having married. With regard to
the status of such relationships after five years, a 2013 report from the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services states that approximately one-half of the cohabitations had become marriages, approximately
one third had dissolved, and the remaining cohabitations had remained
44
intact. These statistics support the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s observation that “[c]ohabitation [has become] a common part
of family formation in the United States, and serves both as a step toward
45
marriage and as an alternative to marriage.”
In addition, cohabiting couples increasingly are having children. Research indicates that births to cohabiting couples account for the vast majority of the rise in non-marital births in recent years, as approximately
one fourth of all births in the United States from 2008 to 2013 were to
46
unmarried cohabiting couples. Moreover, it has become significantly
less common for the birth of a child to result in a cohabiting couple
47
choosing to marry. Less than 20% of cohabiting couples will marry within the first year following the birth of a child, a number that has de48
creased by over one-third since 1995. The households of cohabiting
41

Amanda Gardner, More U.S. Couples Living Together Instead of Marrying, CDC
Finds, Health Day (Apr. 4, 2013), http://consumer.healthday.com/public-healthinformation-30/centers-for-disease-control-news-120/more-u-s-couples-livingtogether-instead-of-marrying-cdc-finds-675096.html.
42
Id.
43
The statistics are for women’s first premarital cohabitations during 2006–2010.
Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention, Nat’l Health Statistics Reports No.
64, First Premarital Cohabitation in the United States: 2006–2010 National
Survey Of Family Growth 1 (2013) [hereinafter Premarital Cohabitation in
the United States], http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf.
44
Id. at 1, 5.
45
Id. at 7.
46
Brian Braiker, CDC: More Babies Being Born to Unmarried Cohabiting Couples,
Parenting (April 9, 2013), http://www.parenting.com/blogs/show-and-tell/brianbraiker/co-habitation-wedlock (“A full 23 percent of all births within the past five
years have been to non-married cohabiting women.”); Glenn T. Stanton, Marriage,
Class, and Social Justice, Nat’l Rev. Online (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.
nationalreview.com/home-front/292530/marriage-class-and-social-justice/glenn-tstanton (“Nearly all the increase in unmarried child-bearing over the past ten years is
from cohabiting mothers.”).
47
Premarital Cohabitation in the United States, supra note 43, at 6.
48
Id.
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couples also often include children from the partners’ previous relationships, with cohabiting households currently almost as likely to contain
49
children as marital households.
The rise in cohabitation has led to a number of significant consequences, and chief among them is the lack of legal protections currently
accompanying many significant relationships. Unfortunately, under current law, couples who choose cohabitation instead of marriage are often
left with few legal protections for their relationships. While the rights and
obligations governing marriage number in the thousands and extend to
almost every area of the law, very few of these rights and obligations at50
tach to cohabiting relationships. In addition, with regard to dissolution,
the legal frameworks governing divorce and legal separation are not applicable to the dissolution of cohabiting relationships. Instead, cohabiting couples generally are left to bring claims arising from the relationship pursuant to contract law or various equitable principles, and in some
51
jurisdictions even these limited remedies are unavailable. Moreover,
even in jurisdictions that are willing to recognize claims arising from the
dissolution of cohabiting relationships, only written contracts, which co52
habiting couples rarely enter into, provide any degree of predictability.
If there is no written contract, the result depends upon a “case-by-case
determination of whether the court believes the parties’ conduct during
the relationship created an express or implied contract or gave rise to an
53
equitable claim for relief, which has led to highly unpredictable results.”
Regrettably, the decline in marriage and rise of cohabitation means that
49

Feinberg, supra note 7, at 60.
Id. at 74; see also Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 Tul. L. Rev. 573, 587
(2013) (“Lack of legal recognition [for unmarried couples] also means denial of
many benefits and rights that are bestowed by the state and granted by other third
parties to a married couple during their relationship, ranging from tax exemptions to
hospital visitation rights, immigration rights, parental presumption, and extension of
health benefits.”); Bowman, supra note 40, at 39 (explaining that “cohabitants have
been offered very few rights”); Emily M. May, Note, Should Moving In Mean Losing
Out? Making a Case to Clarify the Legal Effect of Cohabitation on Alimony, 62 Duke L.J. 403,
421–22 (2012). “The extent to which the law otherwise protects unmarried
cohabitants, however, is limited. There is no comprehensive law of cohabitation in
the United States. In every American jurisdiction, unmarried cohabitants have fewer
legal rights and duties than do married partners [and] the law generally does not
recognize cohabitation as a legally significant status.” Id.
51
Douglas E. Abrams et al., Contemporary Family Law 266–67 (3d ed.
2012); Patricia A. Cain, Taxing Families Fairly, 48 Santa Clara L. Rev. 805, 832
(2008); Deborah A. Widiss, Leveling Up After DOMA, 89 Ind. L.J. 43, 59 n.78 (2014).
52
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 65.
53
Id; see also Aloni, supra note 50, at 590–91 (“Moreover, as is often the case in
establishing the rights of unmarried couples, the judicial inquiry inevitably involves
an ‘intrusive examination into factors that qualify a relationship as “maritallike”’ . . . .” (quoting Cynthia Grant Bowman, Unmarried Couples, Law, and
Public Policy 57 (2010).
50
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significantly fewer individuals receive substantial rights and protections
within their relationships.
II. LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
GOVERNING MARRIAGE
A. Consideration of Marriage Duration and the Presence of Children
One factor that may have contributed to society’s decreasing enthusiasm for marriage is that, despite the significant diversity that exists
among marital relationships with regard to important characteristics such
as the length of the marriage and the presence of children within the
marriage, the legal frameworks governing intact and dissolving marriages
fail to fairly, predictably, and effectively recognize and accommodate
those differences. Instead, the package of legal rights and obligations accompanying intact marriages remains largely the same throughout the
54
course of the marriage. In addition, dissolving marriages within a given
jurisdiction are, for the most part, subject to the same broad default rules
for determining post-dissolution rights and obligations regardless of the
55
particular characteristics of the marriages in question.
1. Intact Marriages
When it comes to the large package of legal rights and obligations
accompanying intact marriages that arise from the spousal relationship,
with very few exceptions these rights and protections remain the same
over the course of the marriage regardless of the length of the marriage
or the presence of children within the marriage. As soon as a person becomes lawfully married, he or she receives a wide variety of rights and obligations on the basis of his or her status as a spouse. The rights and protections accompanying intact marriages extend across almost every area
of the law and relate to, among other things, taxes, property, testimonial
privileges, support, debt liability, healthcare, immigration, Medicare, Social Security, family and medical leave, visitation, financial and health56
related decision-making, and various claims in tort and contract. When
a child is born during the marriage, new rights and obligations arise between each parent and the child, but the presence of children generally
does not change the intra-spousal rights and obligations governing the
57
intact marriage. Similarly, spousal rights and obligations governing intact marriages generally do not increase, decrease, or otherwise change

54

See infra Section II.A.1.
See infra Section II.A.2.
56
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 74, 83; Overview of Federal Benefits Granted to Married
Couples, Hum. Rts. Campaign, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/an-overview-offederal-rights-and-protections-granted-to-married-couples.
57
See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
55
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58

as the marriage increases in length. The vast majority of the rights and
obligations accompanying intact marriages arise at the beginning of the
marriage, are not conditioned on the marriage lasting a certain number
of years, and do not disappear when the length of the marriage reaches a
59
certain number of years.
There are, however, a few exceptions to the general rule that the
spousal rights and obligations governing intact marriages do not increase
or decrease based upon the length of the marriage. These exceptions
60
tend to arise mainly under federal law. For example, one exception involves eligibility to collect Social Security retirement or Medicare benefits
based upon a current spouse’s earnings record, which is a right that does
not come into existence until a couple has been married for at least one
61
year. Another exception arises in the context of federal immigration
law. When a nonresident spouse receives the right to immigrate to the
United States based upon his or her marriage to a U.S. resident, the
length of the marriage determines the type of immigrant visa that the
62
nonresident spouse will receive. Nonresident spouses who have been
married to U.S. residents for over two years at the time they enter the
63
United States receive a permanent visa. If the couple has been married
for less than two years at the time the nonresident spouse enters the
58

See, e.g., Internal Revenue Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Publication
501, Exemptions, Standard Deduction, and Filing Information 6 (2014),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p51.pdf (explaining that a person is eligible to file a
joint federal tax return with his or her spouse as soon as he or she is recognized as
married under state law); Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet
#28F, Qualifying Reasons for Leave Under the Family and Medical Leave Act 2
(2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28f.htm (explaining that
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act may be taken in order to care for a
spouse, and defining a spouse as a “husband or wife as defined or recognized in the
state where the individual was married and including individuals in a same-sex
marriage or common law marriage”); Ashley E. Rathbun, Marrying into Financial
Abuse: A Solution to Protect the Elderly in California, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 227, 231–32
(2010) (explaining that as soon as an individual marries, his or her spouse receives
power of attorney and healthcare proxy preferences under state statutes governing
situations in which the individual has not executed any advance directives naming
another person as his or her healthcare proxy or power of attorney).
59
See Rathbun, supra note 58.
60
See infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text.
61
Christopher R. Tamborini & Kevin Whitman, Women, Marriage, and Social
Security Benefits Revisited, Soc. Security Bull., no. 4, 2007, at 1, 2, http://www.
ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v67n4/67n4p1.html#mt6; Medicare Rights Ctr., Under What
Conditions Would My Spouse’s Work History Qualify Me for Premium-Free Part A?, Medicare
Interactive,
http://www.medicareinteractive.org/page2.php?topic=counselor&
page=script&script_id=338.
62
Immigrant Visa for a Spouse of a U.S. Citizen (IR1 or CR1), U.S. Dep’t of St.,
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/immigrate/types/family/immediaterelative.html.
63
Id.
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United States on an immigrant visa, however, the nonresident spouse re64
ceives only a “conditional visa.” In order for the nonresident spouse to
receive a permanent visa, the couple must jointly file an application proving the bona fides of their marriage within 90 days of the two-year anni65
versary of the nonresident spouse’s entry into the United States; failure
to complete the application can result in the nonresident spouse being
66
deported.
Aside from these rare exceptions, the vast majority of the hundreds
of spousal rights and obligations that accompany intact marriages are
provided to the spouses as soon as they receive a marriage license and
remain the same throughout the duration of the intact marriage regardless of how long the marriage has been in existence or whether the couple has children. In terms of dissolving marriages, while the rights and
obligations provided to spouses when marriages dissolve through divorce,
legal separation, or the death of one of the spouses differ significantly
from the rights and obligations that accompany intact marriages, the
overall legal frameworks governing intact and dissolving marriages are
similar in one important sense. Namely, as with the rights and obligations
accompanying intact marriages, dissolution-related spousal rights and obligations generally do not automatically arise, increase, or decrease based
upon the duration of the marriage or the presence of children within the
marriage.
2. Dissolving Marriages
There are a number of spousal rights and obligations that arise from
the dissolution of a marriage through either divorce or the death of one
of the spouses. The major rights and obligations relate to, among other
things, marital property, debt liability, spousal support, taxes, inher67
itance, and eligibility for federal programs like Social Security and Med68
icare based upon a former spouse’s earnings record. Although the birth
or adoption of a child creates many rights and obligations between each
spouse and the child both before and after marital dissolution, it general69
ly does not alter spousal post-dissolution rights and obligations. Similar64

Id.
Id.; U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Policy Manual, vol. 12, pt. G,
ch. 5 (2015), http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Print/PolicyManual.html.
66
8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c) (2012). If the marriage has ended prior to the filing of the
application, the nonresident spouse is subject to removal from the country unless
certain conditions are met. Remove Conditions on Permanent Residence Based on Marriage,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (2015), http://www.uscis.gov/green-card/aftergreen-card-granted/conditional-permanent-residence/remove-conditionspermanent-residence-based-marriage.
67
See generally Abrams et al., supra note 51.
68
Retirement Planner: Benefits For Your Divorced Spouse, Soc. SecURITY Admin.,
http://www.ssa.gov/retire2/yourdivspouse.htm.
69
While the presence of minor children means that the court must make
65
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ly, the spousal rights and obligations that stem from dissolution generally
do not automatically arise, increase, or decrease based upon the length
of the marriage, and judicial intervention is required for all divorces re70
gardless of the duration of the marriage or the presence of children.
As in the context of intact marriages, however, in the post-dissolution
context there are rare exceptions wherein either the length of marriage
or the presence of children within the marriage is determinative of
71
spousal rights and obligations. These exceptions arise mainly under
72
federal law. For example, with regard to dissolutions that occur due to
divorce, the length of the marriage is determinative of a divorced
spouse’s right to claim Medicare and Social Security retirement or survi73
vor’s benefits on the basis of an ex-spouse’s earnings record. In order to
be eligible for such benefits, the individual seeking the benefits must
have been married to the individual upon whose record he or she claims
74
the benefits for at least ten years prior to the divorce. With regard to
dissolutions that occur due to the death of one of the spouses, to collect
Social Security survivor’s benefits following a spouse’s death, a surviving
spouse must have been married to the deceased individual for at least
75
nine months. In addition to the length of the marriage, the presence of
determinations regarding child support and child custody, these rights and
obligations arise between each spouse and the children, not between the two spouses.
More specifically, if there are minor children involved in the dissolution, the spouses
will also receive rights and obligations relating to the custody, care, and financial
support of their children. However, while the presence of children means that each
spouse’s rights with regard to the care, custody, and support of the children must be
determined, the presence of children does not automatically alter the spouses’ postdissolution rights and obligations to each other. Although the spouse who does not
receive primary physical custody of the child generally has to pay child support to the
other spouse, that money ultimately is owed to the child and is to be used for the
benefit of the child. Unlike spousal support, child support is not an obligation owed
by one spouse to the other spouse. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 287 S.E.2d 378, 379
(Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (“Child support is the right of the child and not of its
custodian.”); Williams v. Williams, 87 Cal. Rptr. 754, 756 (Ct. App. 1970) (“[T]he
[support] obligation is due to the child . . . [and] the parent, to whom such support
is paid, is but a mere conduit for the disbursement of that support.”); see also Tia M.
Young, Comment, Removing the Veil, Uncovering the Truth: A Child’s Right to Compel
Disclosure of His Biological Father’s Identity, 53 How. L.J. 217, 228 (2009) (“Furthermore,
child support is the right of the child, not the option or choice of the child’s
[custodial parent].”).
70
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 62.
71
See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
72
The presence of children is determinative most commonly with regard to
benefits a spouse is eligible for upon the death of the other spouse. See infra note 77
and accompanying text.
73
Soc. Security Admin., supra note 68; Medicare Rights Ctr., supra note 61.
74
Soc. Security Admin., supra note 68; Medicare Rights Ctr., supra note 61.
75
Soc. Security Admin., Program Operations System Manual, § RS
00207.011 Widow(er)’s Benefit Definitions and Requirements, https://secure.
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children within the marriage is determinative of certain spousal rights in
76
the context of Social Security survivor’s benefits. For example, the existence of minor children within the marriage may render inapplicable the
aforementioned marriage-length requirements for a spouse or ex-spouse
to collect Social Security survivor’s benefits based upon the deceased in77
dividual’s earnings record.
While there are only a few post-dissolution spousal rights and obligations for which the length of the marriage or the presence of children
within the marriage is determinative, these factors usually play at least
some role in judicial decisions regarding two extremely important disso78
lution-related rights. The distribution of marital property and the provision of spousal support upon divorce represent two of the most well79
known and frequently litigated post-dissolution rights between spouses.
In most states, legal determinations regarding the distribution of marital
property and the provision of spousal support upon divorce depend on a
80
list of factors arising from statutes or common law, and the duration of
the marriage and the presence of children within the marriage are al81
most always among the factors provided for the court’s consideration.
More specifically, with regard to judicial determinations of spousal
support, in addition to the statutory factors of the length of the marriage
and the presence of a child whose care limits a spouse’s employment potential, other factors set forth in the spousal-support statutes of a majority
ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0300207001; Mary Beth Franklin, How Long Must Clients Be
Married to Collect Social Security on Each Other? It Depends, Inv. News: Retirement 2.0
(Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20131127/BLOG05/
131129912#; Medicare Rights Ctr., supra note 61.
76
See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
77
Survivors Planner: If You’re the Worker’s Surviving Divorced Spouse, Soc. Security
Admin, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/survivorplan/ifyou3.htm; Soc. Security
Admin., supra note 68. There are a number of other benefits in the Social Security
context for which length of marriage or presence of children plays a determinative
role. For example, the number of credits a deceased individual must have earned in
order for his spouse to receive survivor’s benefits is less if the spouse is caring for the
deceased’s children. Benefits Planner: Social Security Credits, Soc. Security Admin.,
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/credits.html#&a0=3. In addition, the portion of the
estate to which a surviving spouse is entitled when an individual dies intestate is
reduced in some states where the couple has adult children. See Mary Randolph, How
an Estate Is Settled If There’s No Will: Intestate Succession, Nolo, http://www.
nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-estate-settled-if-theres-32442.html.
78
See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
79
See Abrams et al., supra note 51, at 470.
80
Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying an Income
Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 23, 32 (2001);
David N. Hofstein, Scott J.G. Finger & Ellen Goldberg Weiner, Update to Equitable
Distribution in Large Marital Estate Cases, 21 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 439, 439–40
(2008).
81
See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
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of states include the physical and mental health of each spouse; the
needs of each spouse; the earning potential of each spouse; the ages of
each spouse; the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage; the ability of the spouse from whom support is sought to pay; the property distributed as a result of the divorce; and the financial means and resources
82
of each spouse. Moreover, a few other factors are used by at least onefourth of the states in making spousal-support determinations. These factors include, inter alia, marital fault; the contributions of one spouse to
the career, education, or employment of the other spouse; and the effect
that absence from the job market has had on a spouse’s career-related
83
prospects.
With regard to property distribution, in addition to the factors of the
length of the marriage and the custodial responsibility for the children of
the marriage, the factors most commonly governing such decisions also
include the age of each spouse; the mental and physical health of each
spouse; the needs of each spouse; the earning potential of each spouse;
the financial situation of each spouse; the standard of living during the
marriage; and the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition, appre84
ciation, or depreciation of marital property. Other common factors that
courts consider in making property-distribution determinations include
marital fault; financial misconduct; the separate property owned by each
spouse; the liquidity of the property subject to distribution; the contribution of one spouse to the earning power of the other spouse; the foregoing of employment, educational, or training opportunities by one spouse
during the marriage; and any award of spousal support issued by the
85
court.
Unfortunately, while most marital-property distribution and spousal86
support laws list as factors the length of the marriage and the presence
87
of children, they are presented within an extensive, nonexhaustive list
82

Collins, supra note 80, at 33–34.
Id. at 34–35.
84
Hofstein et al., supra note 80, at 441–43; David N. Hofstein, Ellen Goldberg
Weiner, & Christopher Marrone, Equitable Distribution in Large Marital Estate Cases, 17
J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 307, 310–13 (2001).
85
Hofstein et al., supra note 80, at 442–43, 445; Hofstein et al., supra note 84, at
312–13.
86
Collins, supra note 80, at 33 (listing length of the marriage as one of the factors
most commonly used in spousal-support statutes); Hofstein et al., supra note 80, at
442 (listing length of the marriage as one of the factors commonly used in propertydistribution statutes).
87
Collins, supra note 80, at 34 (listing “presence of a child in the home whose
care precludes or limits employment” as one of the factors most commonly used in
spousal-support statutes); Brett R. Turner, State Statutes and Case Law Summaries, 3
Equit. Distrib. of Property 3d app. A (database updated 2014), Westlaw EQDP
(surveying state property-distribution laws, many of which list the presence of
children as a factor).
83
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of factors for the court to consider, and there is no guarantee that these
two factors will have any significant effect on the court’s decision. Notably, the statutes are completely silent with regard to how the court should
weigh each of the many factors listed, which leaves the court to use its
88
discretion in considering an unwieldy list of diverse factors. Current law
therefore fails to ensure that the important factors of marriage duration
and presence of children within the marriage are adequately considered
in determining marital-property and spousal-support rights upon divorce.
B. Criticisms of the Current Framework and the Corresponding State-Based
Efforts to Address the Concerns Raised
As detailed above, in the context of marriage there are few rights
and obligations between spouses for which the objective and important
factors of marriage duration or presence of children are determinative.
Instead, these two important factors play either an unpredictable, tenuous role or no role at all with regard to many of the spousal rights and
obligations that arise from marriage. This has contributed to the inconsistent, inefficient, unpredictable, and unfair results that often occur in
89
legal disputes involving spousal rights and obligations. Although the factors of marriage duration and presence of children play only limited
roles both in the laws governing intact marriages and in the laws governing dissolving marriages, criticism has focused mainly on the laws governing dissolution, as this is the context in which legal claims involving
90
spousal rights and obligations most often arise. While this Article will
not restate all the detailed criticisms advanced by legal scholars and
commentators, it is important to understand the basic problems faced by
the laws governing dissolution, as well as how the legal treatment of the
88

Alicia Brokars Kelly, Actualizing Intimate Partnership Theory, 50 Fam. Ct. Rev.
258, 264 (2012) (“The ‘rule’ for alimony nationwide is that it is to be awarded in the
court’s discretion based on consideration of a non-exhaustive list of factors, none of
which are accorded any particular weight.”); Twila B. Larkin, Guidelines for Alimony:
The New Mexico Experiment, 38 Fam. L.Q. 29, 38 (2004) (“While statutes enumerate
specific factors for consideration in determining alimony, the statutes are uniformly
silent as to the manner in which these factors should be utilized in calculating an
award[, n]ot a single jurisdiction ranks the relative significance or weight of any
statutory factor[, and n]o statute explains how a judge should apply the criteria
listed.”)(footnotes omitted); Sarah E. Fette, Comment, Learning from Our Mistakes: The
Aftermath of the American Divorce Revolution as a Lesson in Law to the Republic of Ireland, 7
Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 391, 416 (1997) (explaining that under most state
property distribution statutes “judges may base their decisions on any of the statutory
factors which they personally deem important they may give a single factor . . .
‘disproportionate and dispositive weight.’” (quoting Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the
Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and
Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 67, 93 (1993))).
89
See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
90
See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
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important factors of marriage duration and presence of children has
contributed to these problems. The criticism has arisen in the context of
vital post-dissolution rights such as the divorce-based rights of spousal
support and property distribution, where objective factors like marriage
91
duration and presence of children play only limited roles. It has also
arisen in the context of dissolution-related rights that involve no consideration of these factors, including, for example, certain inheritancerelated spousal rights and rights relating to the process that must be un92
dertaken in order to obtain a divorce.
For some dissolution-related rights, marriage duration and presence
of children are factors, but often play only tenuous, unpredictable roles.
With regard to spousal support, which is often one of the most conten93
tious divorce-related issues, a common criticism set forth by legal commentators and scholars is that “[t]he broad discretion vested in judges to
determine alimony eligibility and quantification, together with the absence of a theory to guide decision-making, has produced an alimony re94
gime that is marked by unpredictability, uncertainty, and confusion.”
Critics assert that the rules governing spousal support, which simply provide a nonexhaustive, lengthy list of factors for judges to consider without
indicating how the factors should be weighed or applied, essentially
amount to an “anything goes” legal framework, leading to unfair and in95
consistent decisions. Critics have further stressed that judges may weigh
the factors in any manner that they please, and “may give a single fac96
tor . . . ‘disproportionate and dispositive weight.’” In recent years, the
virtually unlimited discretion provided to judges has resulted in the provision of spousal-support awards in only 15% of divorce cases, with the
awards often providing only a limited amount of support for a short time
97
period. The lack of predictability has also discouraged divorcing parties
from settling their disputes, which results in a greater number of couples
having to endure the financially and emotionally draining process of liti98
gating these claims, and increased the clog in the court system.
Similar criticisms regarding a lack of consistency, predictability, and
fairness have been made by legal commentators and scholars with regard
to the laws governing marital-property distribution upon divorce. As is
the case with spousal support, judicial decisions regarding marital91

See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131–138 and accompanying text.
93
Larkin, supra note 88, at 38.
94
Cynthia Lee Starnes, Alimony Theory, 45 Fam. L.Q. 271, 271 (2011).
95
Kelly, supra note 88, at 264; Larkin, supra note 88, at 38.
96
Fette, supra note 88, at 416 (quoting Starnes, supra note 88, at 93).
97
Kelly, supra note 88, at 264.
98
Rachel Biscardi, Dispelling Alimony Myths: The Continuing Need for Alimony and the
Alimony Reform Act of 2011, 36 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 1, 20, 36 (2014); Kelly, supra note
88, at 264.
92
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property distribution upon divorce generally are made through the consideration of a nonexhaustive list of factors, and the weight given to each
99
factor is left to the discretion of the judge. At the most, the statutes
100
merely require that judges consider each of the factors listed. Due to
the use of this system in which “trial judges have virtually unfettered discretion in dividing assets, the financial fate of the economically disadvantaged party often depends on the goodwill or prejudice of a particular
101
judge.” The discretion judges have to “base their decisions on any of
102
the statutory factors [that] they personally deem important” has led to
103
unfair and unpredictable results. Unsurprisingly, research indicates
that the lack of guidance and unfettered judicial discretion in this context have also resulted in judicial abuse, leading the majority of states to
104
begin to investigate gender-based bias within their court systems. Overall, divorce has been decried as one of, if not the most, “discretion-filled
areas of law,” and this discretion is most apparent in the areas of spousal
105
support and marital-property distribution.
In an attempt to respond to these criticisms, a handful of states have
undertaken legal reform in recent years to make dissolution-related
spousal rights more predictable and consistent. Most of the reform has
occurred in the spousal-support context, wherein a few states have created formulas and bright-line rules for determining spousal-support awards
upon divorce. Within these formulas and rules, marriage duration serves
106
as a determinative component. It is important to note, however, that
99

See Hofstein et al., supra note 80, at 439–41.
See id.
101
Fette, supra note 88, at 416.
102
Id.
103
Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: The
Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 319,
364 (“[W]hat consistently distinguishes [equitable-distribution statutes] from their
predecessors is not that they are more equitable, but that they are more
unpredictable.” (quoting Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980s, 44 La. L.
Rev. 1553, 1556 (1984))).
104
Fette, supra note 88, at 416.
105
L.J. Jackson, Alimony Arithmetic: More States Are Looking at Formulas to Regulate
Spousal Support, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2012, at 15. Moreover, because trial-court decisions
regarding the rights and obligations arising from divorce are generally reviewed by
appellate courts under an abuse-of-discretion standard, it is very difficult for parties to
successfully appeal such decisions. Collins, supra note 80, at 25 (“The general
standard for appellate reversal of an alimony award from a trial court requires a
finding of abuse of discretion, which renders the correction of idiosyncratic or
inconsistent support awards all the more difficult.” (footnote omitted)); see also John
C. Sheldon, Anticipating the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, Me. B.J., Jan. 1999, at 22 (“Marital property issues tend to be factintensive, and marital distribution statutes tend to be vague and to rely heavily on
judicial discretion.”).
106
See infra notes 107–110 and accompanying text.
100

LCB_20_1_Art_1_Feinberg (Do Not Delete)

20

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

5/24/2016 4:21 PM

[Vol. 20:1

these formulas and rules generally use marriage duration solely to restrict
eligibility for spousal support and to limit the amount of time for which a
person can receive spousal support. They generally do not employ marriage duration to create an entitlement or raise a presumption of entitlement to spousal support. For example, Maine restricts the types of alimony that can be granted for marriages lasting fewer than ten years and
sets a rebuttable, maximum duration of half the length of the marriage
for spousal-support awards granted for marriages lasting between 10 and
107
20 years. Similar to the approach in Maine, Delaware imposes a maximum duration of half the length of the marriage for spousal-support
108
awards for marriages lasting fewer than 20 years. Under Utah law, an
award of spousal support cannot be of a duration that is longer than the
109
length of the marriage, and Texas altogether prohibits spousal support
110
for marriages lasting fewer than ten years.
In another attempt to bring about more consistency, fairness, and
predictability in the spousal-support context, the American Law Institute
(“ALI”) has proposed a spousal-support formula that uses the length of
the marriage as a determinative factor, but otherwise differs significantly
111
from the formulas that have been adopted in states thus far. Unlike the
state-based formulas that use length of the marriage only to limit or deny
support, the ALI’s proposed formula creates presumptions both in favor
112
of and against the issuance of spousal support. More specifically, the
ALI proposal sets forth two types of spousal-support categories. The first
type compensates a spouse who is married to someone with significantly
greater earning capacity for the loss in the marital standard of living as a
113
result of the dissolution. The second type compensates a spouse for the
loss to his or her earning capacity as a result of his or her performing a
114
disproportionate share of childcare activities during the marriage.
Under the ALI proposal, an individual is presumed to be entitled to
an award if the marriage or caretaking lasted for a state-determined duration and there exists a state-determined degree of spousal-income dispar115
ity. Where the presumption of entitlement arises, it can be overcome
116
only if its application would yield a “substantial injustice.” Similarly, an
award may be made where no presumption of entitlement arises only if it
107

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 951-A (2014).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(d) (2009).
109
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (8j) (LexisNexis 2013).
110
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051 (West 2005).
111
See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text.
112
Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis
and Recommendations §§ 5.04–.05 (2002).
113
Id. § 5.04.
114
Id. § 5.05.
115
Id. §§ 5.04–.05.
116
Id.
108
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can be shown that the lack of an award will result in a substantial injus117
tice. To set the presumptive value of the award, the ALI proposes that
states apply a state-specified percentage to the difference between the
spouses’ incomes that increases with the length of the marriage or period
118
of primary caretaking responsibility. With regard to determining the
length of the spousal-support award, the ALI proposal uses a formula that
multiplies the duration of the marriage or caretaking period by a state119
determined percentage to create a presumptive length for the award.
This serves the purpose of ensuring not only that the duration of the
award is not too lengthy, which is the sole purpose of many of the existing state-based formulas, but also that the duration of the award is not
too short. A presumption of indefinite duration arises under the ALI
proposal where the marriage has lasted a state-specified duration and the
120
obligee is over a state-specified age.
In addition to the criticism of the law governing rights such as
spousal support and marital-property distribution, in which the factors of
marriage duration and presence of children play only tenuous, unpredictable roles, other criticism has focused on dissolution-related rights
121
that demonstrate a complete disregard for these important factors.
One example of this involves rights relating to the process that couples
122
must undertake in order to dissolve their marriages. Judicial involvement is required to obtain a divorce regardless of whether the marriage
has lasted for 1 year or 50 years, and regardless of whether the couple has
123
children. To attain a divorce, generally, either one spouse must prove
that the other spouse is at fault for the breakdown of the marriage, which
can lead to lengthy, costly, and hostile judicial hearings. Or, a no-fault divorce can be sought, in which case the couple generally is subject to a

117

Id. § 5.04.
Id. §§ 5.04–.05.
119
Id. § 5.06.
120
Id.
121
See infra notes 122–138.
122
See, e.g., Donald R. Collins, A Legal Doctrine for the Starter Marriage, 33 Okla.
City U. L. Rev. 793, 794 (2008) (criticizing the current legal regime governing
dissolution for requiring the same divorce process for short- and long-term
marriages); Marsha Garrison, Reforming Divorce: What’s Needed and What’s Not, 27 Pace
L. Rev. 921, 941 (2007) (suggesting that instead of requiring the same divorce
procedure for all couples, New York should adopt the summary-dissolution
procedures of other states for short-term marriages with no children and limited
assets in order to “reduce divorce delay, expense, and pain”); Lloyd Cutsumpas & B.
Moses Vargas, Comment, Summary Dissolution: Is Connecticut’s Current System as Effective
as It Should Be?, 6 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 327, 328 (2007) (criticizing the current onesize-fits-all process for divorce and suggesting that “individuals who have been
married for a minimal amount of time with limited assets and no children should
only have to follow minimal procedures to get divorced”).
123
See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 62 & n.159.
118
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waiting period that can range from months to years, depending on the
124
state. Due to the mandatory nature of the requirements involved, divorce in this country can be a costly, time-consuming, and emotionally
125
draining experience, even for individuals involved in the shortest of
marriages.
A minority of states have attempted to address the criticism of the
one-size-fits-all divorce process through the implementation of summarydissolution procedures as alternatives to their standard divorce proce126
dures. The presence of children and duration of the marriage are usu127
ally determinative of eligibility for the summary-dissolution procedures.
More specifically, common requirements for summary-dissolution eligibility are that the marriage has existed for less than a specified amount of
time, that children are not involved, and that there are limited marital
128
assets and debts. Couples who qualify for summary dissolution are generally able to have their marriages dissolved by the court in a timelier
129
manner, and without undergoing a judicial hearing.
Another example of the law disregarding the length of the marriage
in setting forth post-dissolution rights and obligations occurs within the
130
context of inheritance rights following the death of one of the spouses.
In most states, when a spouse dies either without a will (“intestate”) or
with a will that disinherits the surviving spouse, the portion of the decedent spouse’s estate that the surviving spouse receives is a set percentage
determined by state law that does not in any way depend on the length of
131
the marriage. Critics have asserted that the failure to consider the
124

See Abrams et al., supra note 51, at 425.
See Jeffrey R. Baker, The Failure and Promise of Common Law Equity in Domestic
Abuse Cases, 58 Loy. L. Rev. 559, 586 (2012) (“[D]ivorce remains costly and timeconsuming . . . .”); Richard Birke, Mandating Mediation of Money: The Implications of
Enlarging the Scope of Domestic Relations Mediation from Custody to Full Service, 35
Willamette L. Rev. 485, 492 (1999) (“Divorces are potentially expensive, time
consuming, and emotionally draining to litigate.”); Paul Lermack, The Constitution Is
the Social Contract so It Must Be a Contract . . . Right? A Critique of Originalism as
Interpretive Method, 33 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1403, 1438 n.202 (2007) (“Even in nofault American states, where divorces can be had on the simple statements of the
parties that the marriage has broken down, the dissolution of a marriage, with the
concomitant untangling of finances, duties, and family ties, becomes an expensive
and time consuming process.”).
126
See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code § 2400 (2015); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-120.3
(2013); Minn. Stat. § 518.195 (2015); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-130 (2013); Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 125.181 (2013); Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.485 (2013).
127
See statutes cited supra note 126.
128
See statutes cited supra note 126.
129
See, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code §§ 2400–2403 (2015); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-120.3
(2013); Minn. Stat. § 518.195 (2015); Mont. Code Ann. § 40-4-130 (2013); Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§ 125.181–182 (2013); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 107.485–490 (2013).
130
See infra notes 131–42 and accompanying text.
131
See infra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the minority of states
125
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length of the marriage in determining the portion of the estate to which
132
the surviving spouse is entitled leads to unfair results. This criticism is
based on the notion that the expectations and behaviors of spouses in
short-term marriages differ significantly from the expectations and behaviors of spouses in long-term marriages, and that this should be re133
flected by the laws governing spousal-disinheritance issues. To address
this concern in the context of a surviving spouse’s rights when he or she
has been disinherited, a handful of states have adopted the Uniform
134
Probate Code’s elective-share proposal. Under this approach, “the surviving spouse receives a variable portion of the augmented estate based
135
on the length of the marriage,” with the portion to which the surviving
136
spouse is entitled increasing with marriage length. If an individual dies
intestate, however, the length of the marriage generally is not considered
in determining the portion of the estate that the surviving spouse will rethat make the percentage of the estate to which a disinherited spouse is entitled
dependent on the length of the marriage); see also Intestate Succession, Nolo,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/intestate-succession
(compiling
each
state’s approach to intestate succession).
132
See, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis & Josephine Gittler, Family Caregiving and the Law
of Succession: A Proposal, 45 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 761, 775 (2012) (describing the
modern view that “[the] surviving spouse of a long-term marriage should receive a
greater portion of the decedent’s estate than the surviving spouse of a short-term
marriage”); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in our Multiple-Marriage Society: The
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 683, 734–35, 742 (1992)
(explaining why a system in which the elective-share percentage is based upon the
length of the marriage will be superior to “conventional elective-share systems[,
which] produce grossly inaccurate results in nearly every case”).
133
See Gallanis & Gittler, supra note 132, at 776 (describing the Uniform Probate
Code’s approach to the elective share). “[W]ith respect to a marriage lasting fifteen
years or more, the UPC presumes that all (100 percent) of the property owned by
either spouse will have been the fruit of their marital partnership, hence the UPC
provides that the surviving spouse should get half of this (or 50 percent) as an
elective share. With respect to a contrasting example of a marriage lasting less than a
year, the UPC presumes that very little (only 3 percent) of the property owned by
either spouse will have been the fruit of the marital partnership . . . .” Id.
134
See North Carolina Ties Surviving Spouses’ Rights to the Length of the Marriage,
McGuireWoods (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/
Alerts/2013/11/North-Carolina-Surviving-Spouses-Rights.aspx. “Even though the
Uniform Probate Code employs the sliding percentage scale, it is worth noting that
only eight other states (Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, South
Dakota, Tennessee and West Virginia) have adopted this approach for their elective
share statutes. . . . Thus, North Carolina joins a distinct minority of states with this
aspect of its elective share law.” Id.
135
Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage: Death or Divorce, 2005 Utah L.
Rev. 1227, 1249 (2005).
136
Unif. Prob. Code §§ 2-202, 2-203 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2014) (amended 2010)
(stating that the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the “marital-property
portion of the augmented estate,” and using length of the marriage to determine
what percentage of the augmented estate constitutes the marital-property portion).
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137

ceive; this is true even under the Uniform Probate Code’s approach to
138
intestate succession.
While identifying and analyzing every spousal right and obligation
for which marriage duration and presence of children are not dispositive
is beyond the scope of this Article, this Section has highlighted some of
the most problematic examples of spousal rights and obligations for
which marriage duration, presence of children, or both play either tenuous roles or no role at all. Only a few states have taken concrete steps to
remedy the substantial harm caused by the failure to consider these factors adequately in determining spousal rights and obligations, and thus
significant problems continue to pervade the legal framework governing
marriage. In order to craft an appropriate solution to these problems, it
is necessary first to ascertain the specific goals of an improved legal regime governing marriage, and then to identify the types of legal reform
that will further those goals.
III. GOALS THAT A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MARRIAGE
SHOULD AIM TO FURTHER
Despite all of the issues currently faced by the institution of marriage
in the United States, it is clear that for the foreseeable future, marriage
will remain as the primary legal status for adult-relationship recognition.
Approximately 90% of middle-aged adults are married or have been married in the past, researchers predict that a similar percentage of women
who are currently in their twenties or thirties will marry, and the vast ma139
jority of young adults plan to marry in the future. Thus, while proposals
aimed at eliminating marriage as a legal status and as a proxy for distrib140
uting rights and obligations are important, it is equally important to
consider how this institution, which is very unlikely to be eliminated anytime soon, can be improved to protect individuals more effectively. Similarly, proposals that focus on the promotion of legal statuses that func141
tion as alternatives to marriage are valuable. Ideally, the greater
availability of non-marital statuses and the improvement of the current
legal framework governing marriage would work together to promote a
better system of adult relationship recognition in the United States. The
existence of such statuses as marriage alternatives, however, will not solve
137

See Nolo, supra note 131 (providing every state’s intestate-succession rules).
Unif. Prob. Code §§ 2-101, 2-102 (2010).
139
Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Could We? Should We?, 10 J.L. & Fam. Stud.
279, 284–85, 287 (2008).
140
See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of
Dependency 133–38 (2004) (advocating for the abolishment of civil marriage as a
legal category).
141
See, e.g., Aloni, supra note 50, at 586–91; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Darren
R. Spedale, Gay Marriage: For Better or For Worse? 252–55 (2006).
138
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all of the significant problems currently faced by the institution of marriage. Thus, it is essential that marriage is improved regardless of the future viability of non-marital statuses.
In order to effectively and comprehensively improve the institution
of marriage in the United States, a new legal framework governing marriage should aim to accomplish a number of important underlying goals.
An initial goal should be to provide more people with rights and protections for their relationships, something that has become a significant
problem with the decline of marriage in recent years. In addition, an improved framework should seek to help couples determine whether marriage is the right choice for them, and should aim to filter well-suited relationships into the institution of marriage. Supporting and stabilizing
intact marriages to the greatest extent possible, encouraging the continuation of healthy marriages, and facilitating the termination of unhealthy
marriages are also essential goals. Finally, an improved legal framework
should seek to provide more fairness and predictability in the context of
the rights and obligations arising from the dissolution of both short- and
long-term marriages.
A. Protecting a Greater Number of Relationships, Helping Couples Determine if
Marriage Is Right for Them, and Filtering Well-Suited Relationships into the
Institution of Marriage
With the declining marriage rate and increasing rate of non-marital
cohabitation, a substantial number of individuals currently lack legal pro142
tections within their important relationships. Not only is the number of
cohabiting couples on the rise, but the average length of cohabitation is
also increasing, resulting in individuals spending greater lengths of time
143
in relationships that lack legal protections. An important initial goal of
a new legal framework governing marriage should be to encourage more
individuals involved in significant cohabiting relationships to opt-in to
receiving legal rights and protections for their relationships. Providing
legal protections to relationships that would otherwise remain unprotected likely would result in greater stability within the relationships and
more just outcomes for the individuals involved in such relationships in
144
the event of dissolution.
While providing legal protections to more relationships is an important goal in and of itself, the issues faced by the institution of marriage will not be solved by simply having more couples opt-in to it. The
framework therefore needs to accomplish more than merely encouraging
more couples to marry. Marriage will be strengthened only if couples
142

See supra Section II.
See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
144
See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequate
rights and protections applicable to the dissolution of cohabiting relationships).
143
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who are truly ready and well-suited for marriage opt-in. It will not be
strengthened by couples who are not ready or whose relationships are
not well-suited for marriage nevertheless choosing to marry and then
shortly thereafter undergoing messy and acrimonious divorce proceedings. As Professor Marsha Garrison has noted, “[b]ecause only lowconflict, enduring relationships offer significant personal benefits to
adult partners and their children, only initiatives aimed at promoting this
145
narrow category of marriages are justifiable.” Consequently, efforts
146
“that aim to promote marriage more broadly should be resisted.”
In terms of determining whether a relationship is well-suited for
marriage, as the consistently high divorce rate in this country demonstrates, it remains true that many individuals are unable to predict
whether marriage is the right choice for their relationships. Moreover, it
is clear that depending upon cohabitation alone to make such a determination is insufficient. While many couples view cohabitation as providing a trial run for marriage, and cohabitation likely filters out some por147
tion of relationships that are not suitable for marriage, it does not
148
effectively filter out all such relationships. Notably, couples who cohabit
before marriage experience divorce rates roughly equal to couples who
149
do not cohabit before marriage. This is unsurprising—the legal consequences and societal expectations of marriage and cohabitation are whol150
ly different.
Considering that the highest rate of divorce occurs during the early
years of marriage and that premarital cohabitation does not significantly
151
lessen the probability of divorce, it seems that to truly be able to determine whether marriage is suitable for their relationships, couples need to
actually experience at least some of the legal consequences and societal
expectations that accompany marriage. Thus, while providing rights to
more relationships, the legal framework governing marriage also needs
to reflect and provide for the fact that many couples do not know whether marriage is right for them until they try it. In this regard, an improved
legal framework governing marriage should facilitate couples’ evaluations of their relationships by providing a trial period during which cou-

145

Garrison, supra note 139, at 314.
Id.
147
Id. at 301 (“[T]he rise of cohabitation may have further reduced the number
of conflicted marriages by eliminating them before marriage takes place.”).
148
See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
149
Taryn Hillin, New Research Says Living Together Before Marriage Doesn’t Lead To
Divorce, The Huffington Post (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/03/11/divorce-cohabitation-stud_n_4936928.html; Stephanie Pappas,
Cohabitation Doesn’t Cause Divorce After All, Fox News (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.
foxnews.com/health/2014/03/10/cohabitation-doesnt-cause-divorce-after-all/.
150
See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
151
See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
146
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ples can experience some of the legal and societal consequences of marriage. In addition, the framework should provide a fair, simple, and efficient exit process for those couples who determine during the trial period that marriage is not right for them, so that such couples may be
filtered out of the institution of marriage prior to undergoing significant
financial and familial entanglement. The availability of this type of exit
process, which explicitly acknowledges the difficulty of determining
whether a relationship is suitable for marriage prior to entering the institution, ideally will have the added benefit of allowing couples to avoid
the hostility, blame, and stigma that often accompany early marital disso152
lution. A system that succeeds in filtering well-suited relationships into
marriage, and poorly-suited relationships out of marriage before significant entanglement occurs, will undoubtedly improve the institution of
marriage.
B. Providing Relevant Rights to Intact Marriages, Encouraging the
Continuation of Low-Conflict Marriages, and Facilitating the Termination of
Unhealthy Marriages
Beyond granting important protections to relationships that otherwise would remain unprotected and performing an initial filtering function, an improved legal framework governing marriage should aim to
provide more relevant support to the relationships that remain within the
institution after the trial period. It also should encourage the continuation of healthy, low-conflict marriages and facilitate the termination of
the portion of marriages that inevitably will become unhealthy despite
the support provided by the legal framework. In order to provide more
relevant rights and protections to intact marriages, the framework governing intact marriages must depart from its current one-size-fits-all approach. More specifically, an improved framework should provide rights
and obligations that adjust over the course of the marriage to better reflect and support the spouses’ current situation. This would result in
marriage serving a more useful function throughout the course of the
marital relationship. Couples should also be provided with greater flexibility and autonomy to structure their ongoing marriages in the manner
that is best for them, based upon the unique circumstances of their relationships.
Encouraging the continuation of low-conflict marriages and facilitating the termination of unhealthy marriages are also essential goals. Marriage advocates often claim that marriage is important because it im153
proves the well-being of individuals in our society. These advocates
152
For a discussion of the feelings of shame and stigma that often accompany
early marital dissolution, see Pamela Paul, The Starter Marriage and the Future
of Matrimony (2002).
153
See, e.g., Linda J. Waite & Maggie Gallagher, The Case for Marriage
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frequently tout the physical, mental, and financial benefits that accom154
pany marriage, both for the spouses and for their children. It is important to understand, however, that the benefits of marriage to spouses
and their children are directly dependent upon the quality of the marital
155
relationship. Low-conflict marriages are “associated with significant
health, wealth, and happiness benefits for adult marriage partners and,
156
to an even greater extent, their children.” High-conflict marriages,
however, have quite different effects on the well-being of the spouses and
157
their children. Marriages which involve significant discord and stress
158
are associated with negative health results for the spouses. Not only do
high-conflict marriages have negative health effects for the spouses, but
such marriages are also often severely detrimental to the children in159
volved. More specifically, “researchers have found that the continuation
of a high-conflict marriage is negatively associated with children’s health
and happiness, just as it is for adults; indeed, longitudinal surveys show
that ‘parents’ marital unhappiness and discord have a broad negative
160
impact on virtually every dimension of offspring well-being.’”
Thus, while it is important that the legal framework governing mar161
riage initially filters well-suited relationships into the institution, it is
equally important that the framework provides the type of support that
will give those marriages the best chance of remaining low-conflict.
Healthy marriages should be encouraged and celebrated by the legal
framework governing marriage, and the specific rights and protections
provided under the framework should reflect the strong commitment to
supporting and maintaining healthy, low-conflict relationships. In addition, the legal framework should encourage couples to communicate
about and evaluate their marriages frequently, so that core relationship
problems can be identified and addressed in a timely manner. Acknowledging that there are limits, however, to a legal framework’s ability to
maintain healthy spousal relationships is also essential.

(2001).
154

See id.
Garrison, supra note 139, at 313.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 300–01. “Researchers have thus consistently charted negative health
effects associated with marital discord and stress. Accordingly, the health and wellbeing benefits associated with marriage make a case only for low-conflict marriage.”
Id. (footnote omitted).
158
Id.
159
See id. at 307.
160
Id. (quoting Paul R. Amato & Alan Booth, A Generation at Risk: Growing
Up in an Era of Family Upheaval 219 (1997)).
161
Garrison, supra note 139, at 310–11 (“[T]o provide lasting benefits to
children, state policy must succeed not just in encouraging parents to marry, but also
to marry well and stay married.”).
155

LCB_20_1_Art_1_Feinberg (Do Not Delete)

2016]

GRADUAL MARRIAGE

5/24/2016 4:21 PM

29

Inevitably, some relationships will deteriorate despite a marriagesupportive legal framework. Individuals and situations undoubtedly
change over the years, and love is a complex and incompletely under162
stood human emotion. A legal framework that does not explicitly
acknowledge this reality and instead blindly attempts to encourage all
marriages to remain ongoing does not protect the well-being of those in163
volved in the institution of marriage. As mentioned above, to promote
the well-being of families, the framework should encourage the evaluation of marriages by the parties involved. This will aid individuals in recognizing when their marriages are unhealthy and allow them to react accordingly by taking steps to improve or, if that is not possible, end the
marriage. While it has been established that marital dissolution is associated with some negative consequences for the children involved, living
within a high-conflict marriage is associated with even greater negative
164
effects for children. Accordingly, there will be instances in which ending the marriage is in the best interests of the spouses and their children,
and an optimal legal framework should facilitate dissolution in such situ165
ations. In addition, it is important that the laws governing marital dissolution are reformed to provide more fairness, consistency, and predictability so that the law is not responsible for dissuading individuals in highconflict marriages from seeking dissolution.
C. Protecting Marital Expectations at Dissolution
As long as there is marriage, there will also be marital dissolution.
Unfortunately, the current laws governing marital dissolution face significant problems relating to fairness, efficiency, consistency, and predicta166
bility. These problems not only affect the individuals who undergo the
dissolution process, but they also affect overall societal views of marriage.
The issues pervading the current laws governing dissolution cast marriage in a negative light and likely contribute to the current societal dis167
comfort and uncertainty with regard to the institution of marriage. The
lack of fairness, efficiency, predictability, and consistency in the dissolution context has resulted in marriage becoming a very high-risk undertaking, which has likely deterred a significant number of people from
marrying.

162

This complexity is reflected by the consistently high divorce rate in the United
States. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
163
See supra notes 157–160 and accompanying text.
164
Garrison, supra note 139, at 307.
165
Id. at 314 (“Indeed, for high-conflict relationships, the data suggest that
government policy should aim at discouraging marriage and facilitating divorce.”).
166
See supra Section II.B.
167
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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The people most directly affected by the problematic laws governing
dissolution, however, are those who actually experience marital dissolution. The law must do a better job of protecting these individuals. In
terms of fairness, it is important that the new legal framework governing
marriage departs from the existing framework in that it does not provide
one set of broad default rules to govern all marital dissolutions. For example, a 50-year marriage in which three children were raised should not
be subject to the same set of broad default rules as a 3-year marriage that
does not involve children. As noted above, marriages that end in divorce
168
vary significantly in terms of length and presence of children. A new
framework should aim to more effectively protect the differing expectations involved in marriages marked by significantly different objective
characteristics. In addition to changing the substantive rules governing
the rights and obligations arising from dissolution, to accommodate the
vastly different types of marriages undergoing dissolution more fairly and
efficiently, the procedure involved in obtaining a marital dissolution
169
should be changed to depart from its current one-size-fits-all model.
In terms of predictability and consistency, it is important that the
new framework removes the unbridled discretion that judges currently
have with regard to important post-dissolution rights, such as spousal
170
support and property distribution. Instead, the law should employ clear
rules and presumptions and should grant post-dissolution rights and obligations based upon important and easily identifiable, objective factors.
This clarity would provide married individuals with a better understanding of their spousal rights and obligations; it would also mean that spouses could rely upon the availability of such rights and obligations in the
event of dissolution. In addition to leading to more just and consistent
outcomes in the dissolution context, this would allow individuals to make
more informed decisions regarding their marital conduct and would encourage couples to settle their dissolution-related disputes, thereby avoiding the financial and emotional costs of litigation. While providing greater fairness, efficiency, consistency, and predictability in the dissolution
context will require significant changes to current law, it is an essential
component of an improved legal framework governing marriage.
IV. GRADUAL MARRIAGE: A PROPOSAL FOR AN IMPROVED LEGAL
FRAMEWORK GOVERNING MARRIAGE
To most effectively further the goals identified above, an improved
legal framework governing marriage should be based upon the underlying concept of marriage as a gradual, not immediate, accrual of rights
168

See supra Section II.A.2.
See supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text (discussing the divorce
process).
170
See supra Section II.A.2.
169
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and obligations between spouses. That is, a marriage should not be governed by the same broad set of default rules on day 10 of the marriage as
it is on day 10,000 of the marriage. This Article proposes that the legal
framework governing marriage should identify multiple levels of marriage, and the rights and obligations governing marriage should differ
depending on the level of the marriage. The first marriage level would
provide spouses with the opportunity to determine whether marriage is
171
right for their relationship in a low-risk, supportive setting. Additional
marriage levels would gradually provide spouses with greater rights and
172
obligations. The rights and obligations arising at each level would be
clear. In addition, judicial discretion in altering the rights and obligations would be limited, leading to increased fairness, predictability, and
consistency within the legal framework governing marriage.
Ascension among marriage levels would be based primarily upon two
important criteria: the length of the marriage and the presence of children within the marriage. These two criteria represent easily measurable,
objective considerations that serve as strong indicators of the general
173
types of expectations within marriage. Recognizing that all marriages
are unique, however, and that there will be marriages in which expectations differ from that which would generally be expected based upon the
length of marriage and presence of children, the default rules at each
level would be constructed primarily as strong presumptions as opposed
to inflexible rules mandated for every marriage. Moreover, couples would
be encouraged to evaluate their relationships at each level and have the
flexibility to opt-out of the default level applicable to their relationship if
they determined that the level was ill-suited at that time for their particular relationship.
In setting forth the details of this proposal, this Section will proceed
as follows. It will first explain why the duration of the marriage and the
presence of children within the marriage should be the primary deter174
minants for the various marriage levels. It will then identify the structure and substance of the first marriage level (“level one”) under the
175
proposed framework. It will conclude by discussing the structure and
substance of the additional marriage levels as well as the manner through
which couples would ascend among the levels under the proposed
176
framework. The proposal set forth here aims to serve as a starting point
for wider discussion and exploration of how the legal framework govern-

171
172
173
174
175
176

See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.A.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.C.
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ing marriage could be reformed to serve spouses and their families better, both during and after marriage.
A. Marriage Duration and Existence of Children as Primary Determinants of
Levels
The differing marriage levels under the proposed legal framework
will depend primarily upon the length of the marriage and the presence
of children within the marriage. More specifically, marriages will ascend
to higher levels at set intervals as the marriages increase in duration. In
addition, the presence of children within the marriage, whenever this
first occurs, will result in the marriage rising by one additional level, regardless of the current marriage level. There are a number of reasons
supporting the proposed system’s use of the length of the marriage and
presence of children as the primary factors for determining marriage levels, as these factors are extremely relevant considerations with regard to
177
the conduct and expectations of most married individuals.
In terms of marriage length, generally the greater the duration of
the marriage, the more decisions that will have been made jointly by the
spouses and the more conduct that will have been undertaken by the
spouses based upon the well-being of the family unit as opposed to the
178
individual well-being of the spouses. Decisions, both small and large,
are made by the spouses each day, and the “myriad of small and large decisions over time and daily practice come together to create a shared
179
life.” Importantly, research demonstrates that “[a]s part of a life together, spouses share money; allocate market and care labor; and share
180
financial decisions about production, investment, and consumption.” It
is only logical that as the duration of the marriage increases, these types
of behaviors between the spouses will grow both in number and significance.
More specifically, with regard to economic behaviors, the vast major181
ity of married couples merge their finances completely. In fact, only
182
17% of married couples keep their finances separate to any degree. Researchers have explained that within marriage, “broadly sharing financial
177

See infra notes 178–208 and accompanying text.
Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in
Ongoing Spousal Economic Relations, 47 U. Louisville L. Rev. 113, 124 (2008)
(“Together, spouses decide how to accommodate many interests and variables,
commonly focusing on the welfare of the family as a whole, not singularly on its
individual members.”).
179
Id.
180
Alicia Brokars Kelly, Better Equity for Elders: Basing Couples’ Economic Relations
Law on Sharing and Caring, 21 Temp. Pol. & C.R. L. Rev. 387, 395 (2012).
181
Alicia Brokars Kelly, Navigating Gender in Modern Intimate Partnership Law, 14
J.L. & Fam. Stud. 1, 22 (2012).
182
Id.
178

LCB_20_1_Art_1_Feinberg (Do Not Delete)

2016]

GRADUAL MARRIAGE

5/24/2016 4:21 PM

33

resources is an entrenched social norm and . . . this behavioral standard
is so strong that a hesitance to share money is often interpreted as a lack
of commitment to the relationship and a violation of mutual trust
183
thought essential in marriage.” Married couples generally associate the
merging of their finances “with equality and fairness, with a belief in the
longevity of the relationship, and [with] a . . . ‘togetherness’ seen as vital
184
in the relationship.” As a result of these characteristics, for most married couples, as the years of marriage increase, so too does the overall
amount of finances that will have been merged between the spouses.
In addition to merging their finances, spouses tend to make joint
decisions and to base their conduct upon the welfare of the family unit,
185
as opposed to their individual welfare. Some of the most consequential
decisions married couples make together relate to each spouse’s responsibilities within and outside the home. Within marriage, “spouses typically
engage in a myriad of exchanges—economical and psychological—
186
sharing labor (in and out of the market) and leisure.” Frequently, one
spouse, most often the wife in opposite-sex marriages, will take on more
of the unpaid domestic obligations, freeing the other spouse to spend
187
more time engaging in paid work. In taking these steps, “spouses contribute capital and labor to the marital partnership in the expectation
188
that their mutual contributions will generate shared value.” Along with
taking on more of the domestic work, research indicates that married
women are more likely than cohabiting women to make career sacrifices
189
to support their spouses’ careers. The result of the spouses’ decisions
with regard to the allotment of labor within marriage is that the earning
capacity of the spouse who takes on a greater domestic role is decreased,
190
while the earning capacity of the other spouse is increased. This in183

Kelly, supra note 178, at 122.
Id. at 134 (quoting Charlott Nyman & Sandra Dema, An Overview: Research on
Couples and Money, in Modern Couples Sharing Money, Sharing Life 7, 16 (Janet
Stocks et al. eds., 2007)).
185
Id. at 124 (“Together, spouses decide how to accommodate many interests
and variables, commonly focusing on the welfare of the family as a whole, not
singularly on its individual members.”); Alicia Brokars Kelly, Explaining Intuitions:
Relating Mergers, Contributions, and Loss in the ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, 8 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 185, 194 (2001) (“The decision making
process changes within marriage: it is no longer a simple question of whether a
contemplated choice will be good (or bad) for the individual, but instead whether a
decision will result in a benefit (or harm) for the two of them together.”).
186
Kelly, supra note 185, at 193.
187
Kelly, supra note 180, at 395.
188
Cynthia Lee Starnes, Mothers as Suckers: Pity, Partnership, and Divorce Discourse,
90 Iowa L. Rev. 1513, 1543 (2005).
189
Margaret F. Brinig, The Influence of Marvin v. Marvin on Housework During
Marriage, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1311, 1317 (2001).
190
Starnes, supra note 188, at 1515–16.
184

LCB_20_1_Art_1_Feinberg (Do Not Delete)

34

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

5/24/2016 4:21 PM

[Vol. 20:1

crease in the earning capacity of one spouse and decrease in earning capacity of the other spouse generally becomes greater with each passing
191
year of marriage. Thus, as one scholar has explained, within marriage
the “reallocation of loss is proportional to the length of the marriage in
part because [the spouse who takes on more domestic obligation’s] sense
192
of financial loss itself increases with marital duration.” Overall, “the
longer spouses are married, the more their human capital is inter193
twined.”
The presence of children is also an essential consideration in the
context of many of the important rights and obligations that arise from
marriage. The presence of children in a marriage typically results in one
of the spouses making career-related sacrifices in order to devote more
194
time to childrearing. In opposite-sex marriages, the person making career- or employment-related sacrifices for the welfare of the family unit is
195
most often, but not always, the wife. Married mothers are significantly
more likely than cohabiting mothers to make career sacrifices to care for
196
their children.
Moreover, research indicates that among married
mothers who have a child under the age of one, slightly over half do not
197
engage in any paid work outside the home. Among married mothers
with children under the age of six, approximately 40% do not engage in
198
any paid work outside the home. Strikingly, while over half of women
have left the workforce at least once for reasons relating to caring for

191

Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 75 (1989) (“Where
the wife’s claim is based on a loss in earning capacity arising from her performance of
domestic obligations, the amount of her loss will typically increase with the length of
the marriage.”).
192
Kelly, supra note 185, at 192.
193
Id. at 197.
194
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law:
Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 Harv. J.L. & Gender 1, 2 (2008). “In the typical family
comprising a married couple and children, one spouse modifies her potential for
income in the workplace in order to care for those children, either partially or
entirely, by leaving the workplace altogether. In the vast majority of cases, that parent
is the mother.” Id.
195
Id.; see also Suzanne M. Bianchi, John P. Robinson & Melissa A. Milkie,
Changing Rhythms of American Family Life 13 (2006) (“[I]t remains most
common for couples to follow what is termed a neo-traditional model—with a wife’s
career and labor force participation taking a backseat to a husband’s career
advancement, especially when children are young.”).
196
Brinig, supra note 189, at 1317.
197
Suzanne M. Bianchi, Family Change and Time Allocation in American Families, 638
Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 21, 34 (2011) (“[O]nly 46 percent of married
mothers with a child under age one report any paid work hours . . . .”).
198
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stats., USDL 05-876, Employment
Characteristics of Families in 2004, tbl. 4 (2005), http://www.bls.gov/news.
release/archives/famee_06092005.pdf.
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members of their families, only 1% of men have done the same. Leaving the workforce, even if only for a few years while children are young,
200
can have significant effects on a spouse’s future earning capacity. Research indicates that women who exit the workforce for only two to three
years, which seems at first glance to be a very brief period of time, suffer a
201
30% decrease in lifetime earnings. Notably, the labor-force participation rate (the percent of the population working or looking for work) is
202
higher for unmarried mothers than married mothers.
Even in situations where neither spouse leaves the workforce completely to care for children, it is common for one of the spouses to reduce his or her workforce participation to a part-time basis or make other
career-related sacrifices to devote more time to the care of the chil203
dren. Again, this is usually, but not always, the wife in opposite-sex mar204
riages. This, too, has significant negative effects on the caretaking
205
spouse’s long-term earning capacity. Overall, research indicates that
“the more likely a woman is to have dependent children and be married,
the more likely she is to be a low earner and have fewer hours in the labor market [while t]he opposite holds for men: marriage and dependent
children make it much more likely that a man has higher earnings and
206
works longer hours.”
In summary, the length of the marriage and the presence of children
are essential, highly relevant factors to understanding spousal expectations and behaviors and determining the spousal rights and obligations
that should arise from marriage. In addition, these factors have the added advantage of being both objective and easily measurable. Indeed, as
one scholar has noted, “duration is the only standard related to a mar-

199
Angie K. Young, Assessing the Family and Medical Leave Act in Terms of Gender
Equality, Work/Family Balance, and the Needs of Children, 5 Mich. J. Gender & L. 113,
115–16 (1998).
200
See Kelly, supra note 181, at 27.
201
Id.
202
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Bureau of Lab. Stats., USDL 15-0689, Employment
Characteristics of Families—2014, at 2 (2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/famee_04232015.pdf.
203
Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 194, at 31–32 (“In a typical marital relationship in
which children are raised, the wife chooses to work a modified schedule and care for
her children at least part-time, therefore earning a reduced income.”).
204
See Janet C. Gornick & Marcia K. Meyers, Families that Work 8 (2003)
(“Many mothers engage in various forms of underemployment, opting for jobs that
demand less of them than their skills would otherwise warrant or working part-time
or intermittently (or both).”); Bianchi, supra note 197, at 21 (“Mothers continue to
scale back paid work to meet childrearing demands.”).
205
See Bianchi, supra note 197, at 41; Starnes, supra note 188, at 1516.
206
Inst. FOR Women’s Pol’y Research, Research-in-Brief: Still a Man’s Labor
Market: The Long-Term Earnings Gap (2008), http://www.iwpr.org/publications/
pubs/still-a-mans-labor-market-the-long-term-earnings-gap.
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riage that requires no discussion, negotiation, or interpretation for its
207
application.” Thus, it is logical for these two factors to be the primary
determinants in setting forth the differing levels of marriage and their
corresponding rights and obligations under the proposed system. Even
the current legal framework governing marriage recognizes, to a certain
extent, the importance of these two factors in determining a number of
the important rights and obligations arising from marriage. Federal law
utilizes these factors as determinants for important rights in a number of
208
areas, such as Social Security, Medicare, and immigration. In addition,
these factors are two of the most commonly used factors set forth by state
209
laws with regard to property distribution and spousal support. The
proposed system, however, departs from state-based approaches of listing
these as two of many factors for the court to consider, without any guid210
ance as to how much weight, if any, should be given to each factor. Instead, the proposed system promotes fairness, predictability, and consistency by using these factors as the primary determinants of the rules
and presumptions governing the spousal rights and obligations arising
211
from marriage.
B. Level One: Trial Marriage
The first level under the proposed system, which would automatically
attach upon marriage to couples without children, unless they explicitly
opt-out of this level into an advanced level, represents an important and
unique aspect of the proposal. As an initial matter, the proposed marital
framework should not depart from the current framework. For the legal
status of marriage to attach to their relationships, couples should need to
affirmatively opt-in to the status. Because a goal of the proposed framework is to grant individuals greater autonomy in structuring their rela-

207

Collins, supra note 80, at 53.
Hum. Rts. Campaign, supra note 56.
209
See, e.g., Collins, supra note 80, at 33–34 (“Thirty-nine of the forty states that
list criteria (97.5%) cite the duration of a marriage as a factor to be considered in
awarding alimony. . . . [M]any [state statutes] (72.5%) take into account the presence
of a child in the home whose care precludes or limits employment as a significant
factor.”); Hofstein et al., supra note 80, at 448 (“A frequently mentioned
consideration in equitable distribution is the length of the parties’ marriage prior to
separation or divorce.”); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to
Revive an Old Rule, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev. 359, 369 n.48 (2005–06) (pointing to research
indicating that length is the third most commonly used factor in state property
distribution statutes); see also Turner, supra note 87 (explaining that the presence of
children and/or the parties’ caretaking responsibilities for children are factors in
most state property-distribution statutes).
210
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
211
See infra Sections IV.B and IV.C.
208
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212

tionships, it is only logical that couples should have the ability to determine whether they wish for a legal status to attach to their relationships in the first place, and to make decisions regarding their conduct
within their relationships accordingly.
Level one should encourage partners who are contemplating making
significant commitments to each other to seek legal protections for their
relationship, and should aid couples in determining whether marriage is
well-suited for their relationships before significant financial and familial
entanglement occurs. Spouses who enter into level one should be considered legally married, and they should be granted spousal rights and
obligations in a manner that will allow them to experience, in a significant way, the societal, cultural, and legal expectations involved in marriage. The rights and obligations should be substantially more limited
than those that arise later in the marriage, however, and the dissolution
process should be far less onerous than that which is required at the
more advanced marriage levels. Despite the fact that it will function as a
trial period for many couples, level one should still be labeled as marriage, requiring couples to make an official public commitment. This is
important to ensure that couples are able to experience, in a significant
manner, both the support and expectations that they will encounter from
the world around them as a result of marrying.
The idea of a legal status that functions as a trial marriage for a substantial portion of couples who enter it is not without precedent. For example, in France, the civil-solidarity pact (“PACS”) is available as an al213
ternative to marriage, and for many couples it serves as a trial marriage.
The PACS provides couples with fewer rights and obligations than those
214
that accompany standard marriage. More specifically, the default rules
for the PACS favor the separation of property and do not provide spousal
215
support. Rights provided by the PACS relate to social security, immigration, employment benefits, gift- and inheritance-tax exemptions, the abil216
ity to file joint tax returns, and bereavement leave. Moreover, members
of a PACS must provide mutual support to each other during the relationship, and each partner is responsible for non-excessive debts in217
curred by the other partner for purposes of everyday life. Couples who
212

See supra Section III.B.
Robert Korengold, Marriage or PACS? In France Things Are Changing,
BonjourParis (Oct. 27, 2009), http://www.bonjourparis.com/story/marriage-orpacs-france-things-are-changing/.
214
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 54–55.
215
Aloni, supra note 50, at 640.
216
Marie A. Failinger, A Peace Proposal for the Same-Sex Marriage Wars: Restoring the
Household to Its Proper Place, 10 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 195, 208–09 (2004); Scott
Titshaw, The Reactionary Road to Free Love: How DOMA, State Marriage Amendments, and
Social Conservatives Undermine Traditional Marriage, 115 W. Va. L. Rev. 205, 272 (2012).
217
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 55–56.
213
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enter into PACSs and later terminate their relationships experience far
less of the time, cost, and emotional drain involved in dissolving standard
218
marriages. Judicial involvement is not required to dissolve a PACS, and
only occurs where there is a disagreement and one party brings a post219
dissolution lawsuit. Notably, the vast majority of PACSs that end in dis220
solution are dissolved through the mutual request of the parties. A significant number of couples have opted to marry after spending a period
221
of time in a PACS. Marriage, which automatically dissolves a PACS, has
222
been the reason for PACS dissolutions in over one-third of all cases.
The availability of a status that functions as a trial period for marriage for
many couples is thus serving an important filtering function in France—
helping to identify those couples who are ready for marriage and those
who are not.
Under the proposed system, the specific package of rights and obligations accompanying intact marriages at level one should be designed
to support and stabilize the relationship to the greatest extent possible. It
also should introduce couples to the types of obligations that marriage
entails and provide a fair and efficient dissolution process for couples
who determine that their relationships are not suitable for marriage at
this early trial stage. To this end, rights that are aimed primarily at supporting and stabilizing intact relationships, and that are not premised
upon the couple having reached a deep level of economic entanglement,
should accompany level one. For example, rights relating to family and
medical leave, testimonial privileges, marital parentage presumptions,
and health insurance benefits are among the types of rights that should
be provided at level one. Rights such as those under Social Security and
Medicare that provide benefits to one spouse in an intact marriage, based
upon the earnings record of the other spouse, should not be available at
level one, as neither the length of the marriage nor the reasonable financially related expectations accompanying the marriage at level one justify
223
these types of rights. The current immigration rule for sponsorship of
spouses in marriages that have existed for less than two years, which requires that the immigrating spouse be given a conditional visa until the

218

Yuval Merin, Equality for Same-Sex Couples 139–40 (2002).
Id.
220
Peter de Cruz, Family Law, Sex and Society 272 (2010) (referring to
research indicating that “dissolution is usually consensual, with more than 80 percent
of dissolutions occurring at the request of the two partners”).
221
Aloni, supra note 50, at 641.
222
Id.
223
This is not a significant departure from the status quo with regard to these
rights, which are already dependent on the marriage having reached a certain length.
See supra notes 63 & 70.
219
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marriage is more established, would fit well as the applicable spousal224
immigration rule governing the trial-marriage period.
Similarly, laws that penalize individuals financially for marrying
should not be applicable during level one, as such laws assume complete
225
economic intertwinement between spouses. Thus, for example, laws
that remove existing Social Security benefits in certain circumstances
226
when an individual remarries or disqualify an individual from meanstested public benefits based upon his or her spouse’s earnings would not
227
apply during level one. In addition to reflecting the minimal spousal
financial entanglement that will occur during level one, this is essential
for furthering the proposed system’s underlying goal of encouraging
couples considering marriage to try the institution. The decision to marry, especially among lower-income individuals and elderly individuals
(groups that make up a significant portion of the population engaging in
228
non-marital cohabitation) can be affected by financial disincentives. A
lack of financial stability is often cited by unmarried couples as a reason
229
for not marrying. The absence of marriage-related penalties during
level one is also essential to supporting and stabilizing relationships to
the greatest extent possible during the early years of marriage, when the
230
risk of divorce is greatest.
In terms of the general types of obligations between spouses in intact
marriages that should arise during level one, entering level one should
remain a relatively low-risk undertaking in order to encourage couples to
try marriage. Any obligations should reflect the trial-like nature of level
one and the limited duration and absence of children within marriages

224

See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
See Garrison, supra note 139, at 323. “[W]e cannot simply dismiss initiatives
aimed at eliminating marriage penalties: Rule-evasion that substitutes informal for
formal marriage produces certain procedural costs. To the extent that formal
marriage promotes marital commitment and stability, rule-evasion may also
contribute to the decline of enduring, high-quality marriage.” Id.
226
See, e.g., Soc. Security Admin., supra note 68 (“If your divorced spouse
remarries, he or she generally cannot collect benefits on your record . . . .”).
227
Adam Carasso & C. Eugene Steuerle, The Hefty Penalty on Marriage Facing Many
Households with Children, Future Child., Fall 2005, at 157, 159. (“[M]ost transfer
programs for low-income families with children contain mainly marriage penalties—
the additional income introduced by a spouse generally reduces or even ends benefits
received before the marriage.”); Catherine Rampell, ‘Marriage Penalty’ Takes a Bite Out
of Working Families, Wash. Post (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/catherine-rampell-marriage-penalty-takes-a-bite-out-of-workingfamilies/2014/04/14/a7e51e58-c3f8-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html.
228
Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1276, 1280–81 (2014)
(“[T]he largest groups of cohabitants include poor and low-income individuals who
are the beneficiaries of means-tested programs [and] the elderly . . . .”).
229
Garrison, supra note 139, at 322.
230
See supra notes 28–29.
225
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that fall into level one under the default rules. However, in order to help
couples determine whether marriage is the suitable choice for their relationship, at least some basic responsibilities arising from the marriage
should apply at level one. Since financial incompatibility is among the
strongest predictors for divorce, it is important that couples have the experience of sharing certain basic financially related responsibilities early
in the marriage, and that they are encouraged to communicate their
231
views on financial issues. Therefore, under level one, spouses should be
responsible for sharing household and common expenses; they should
also be responsible for the non-excessive debts of the other spouse that
232
were incurred for the benefit of the marriage.
Post-dissolution rights and obligations for relationships that dissolve
during level one should also be minimal. This is logical for a number of
reasons. As an initial matter, a principal purpose of level one is to allow
couples to experience a low-risk trial period for marriage, and significant
post-dissolution obligations are not compatible with this purpose. Moreover, since spouses will understand level one as a trial period, they will be
better able to manage their expectations about the relationship and conduct themselves accordingly. In addition, as a default rule, level one applies only to marriages of the shortest relative duration that do not involve children. The limited duration and absence of children within marmarriages that dissolve at level one will generally mean that there were
relatively limited opportunities for one spouse to engage in careerrelated and other sacrifices for the welfare of the marital unit, from
which he or she cannot recover, as well as a decreased probability of the
couples’ becoming financially entangled to an irreparable degree.
Consequently, spousal support should be presumed unavailable for
dissolutions that occur at level one, and the property obtained by either
spouse during the marriage should be presumed to be his or her separate
property. In addition, if during level one a spouse dies intestate or disinherits the surviving spouse, there should be a presumption of limited or
233
no inheritance rights for the surviving spouse. To reflect the reality that
some marriages will involve differing expectations despite the structure
of the trial period, however, the legal framework governing postdissolution rights at level one should involve presumptions that can be
rebutted in appropriate circumstances.
The limited post-dissolution rights and obligations arising from level
one will also allow for a significantly easier dissolution process than that
231

Jeffrey Dew et al., Examining the Relationship Between Financial Issues and Divorce,
61 Fam. Rel. 615, 624 (2012).
232
This is the approach that Belgium takes for individuals who have entered the
country’s legal cohabitation status. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 56.
233
See supra notes 135–136 and accompanying text (explaining UPC proposal for
determining a surviving spouse’s elective share amount based upon the length of the
marriage).
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which accompanies most marital dissolutions today. Dissolution at level
one should not require judicial intervention. Instead, parties should be
able to exit the marriage without undergoing a costly, time-consuming,
and emotionally draining judicial process. Dissolution under the proposed system should be granted administratively after a brief waiting period, with notice provided to one party in the event that the other party
seeks the dissolution unilaterally. Moreover, the procedure should be
called something other than divorce to reflect level one’s purpose as a
low-risk trial period for marriage and to reduce the stigma associated
235
with early marital failure. Reducing the stigma associated with early
marital failure will serve the important purpose of encouraging people
who learn through the trial period that their relationship is ill-suited for
marriage to terminate the relationship before greater financial and familial entanglement occurs.
It is important to note that the type of dissolution procedure proposed here is not without precedent in the United States. As mentioned
above, summary dissolution, which allows for marital dissolution in a
quicker timeframe and without a judicial hearing, is available in a number of jurisdictions for dissolution of marriages that share certain charac236
teristics. The most common types of requirements that must be met in
order for marriages to be eligible for summary dissolution are that the
marriages are short in length, do not involve children, and involve a
237
small amount of marital property —characteristics that will generally be
shared by marriages placed into level one under the default rules of the
238
proposed system. In addition, a number of non-marital statuses in the
United States allow for dissolution purely administratively, with judicial
involvement only occurring in the event that one party brings a post239
dissolution lawsuit.
In terms of the level at which couples who are entering marriage
should initially be placed and the autonomy couples should have to optout of that level, as noted above, all couples who do not yet have a common child should be placed in level one by default rule when they marry.
Couples who have children at the time of entering marriage, however,
should not be placed in level one; instead, the default rule should place
these couples in level two. A default rule that places couples who already
share a common child at the time of marrying into level two makes sense
for a number of reasons. Individuals who share a child automatically have
234

See supra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the feelings of shame and stigma often accompanying early
marital dissolution, see generally Paul, supra note 152.
236
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 79.
237
Id.
238
Upon marrying, couples without children would automatically be placed in
level one under the default rules of the proposed system.
239
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 79.
235

LCB_20_1_Art_1_Feinberg (Do Not Delete)

42

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

5/24/2016 4:21 PM

[Vol. 20:1

a significant and ongoing legal relationship because, from the time of the
240
child’s birth, they share the legal obligation to support the child. The
existence of a common child, therefore, necessarily ties the parties together in a long-term, significant manner and justifies the couple’s
241
placement in a level that provides greater rights and obligations. Moreover, since the well-being of children is undoubtedly affected by the wellbeing of their parents, the support-related rights and obligations parents
242
have to each other should be adjusted when children are involved. In
addition, the existence of a common child frequently results in one
member of the relationship altering his or her life in order to devote
more time to caring for the child and often leads to significantly de243
creased earning capacity for that individual. Thus, the limited postdissolution rights accompanying level one are far less appropriate for
couples who share a common child.
It is important to understand that, as with all other levels, couples
would have the ability to opt-out of the level initially applicable to their
marriage. For example, a couple without children would have the ability
to opt-out of level one and into an advanced level if that couple determined that the package of rights and obligations at the advanced level
was better suited for their relationship. Likewise, couples who share a
common child would have the choice to opt-out of level two and into another level, including level one. While, for the reasons discussed above,
placing a couple with children into level one would not be ideal, it is important that couples with children are not dissuaded from marrying, and
level one would provide a number of stabilizing and supportive rights
that the couple and their children would not have if the couple remained
244
unmarried. While couples with children should have the autonomy to
opt-in to level one, the standard dissolution procedure under level one
245
should not be available to such couples. Instead, limited judicial involvement must occur at dissolution in order to determine child-custody
and child-support issues. Notably, while a couple would have the ability to
opt-out of the default level that is initially applicable to its marriage, it is
probable that most couples would abide by the default rules upon entering marriage. This seems especially likely when considering the dearth of

240

Abrams et al., supra note 51, at 589.
See id.
242
See, e.g., Michelle Brandt, A Look at How Parents’ Financial Woes Affect Children’s
Social Behavior, Stan. Med.: Scope (Jan. 26, 2012), https://scopeblog.stanford.
edu/2012/01/26/a-look-at-how-parents-financial-woes-affect-childrens-socialbehavior/.
243
See supra notes 194–206.
244
The package of rights provided under level one includes, for example,
coverage for the spouses under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
245
See supra notes 124–125, 233–235, for a description of the proposed standarddissolution procedure for marriages that dissolve while the couple is at level one.
241
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couples who, upon entering marriage, use contracts to opt-out of the
246
current default rules governing marriage.
The remaining essential detail regarding level one involves the
length of time for which this level should last under the default rules.
Considering the purpose and structure of level one, a two-year default
duration for this level would likely be most logical. This would allow couples to spend a significant amount of time experiencing a number of important legal, societal, and cultural consequences and expectations of
marriage before being asked to make important decisions about the future of their relationships. It also generally represents a reasonable
amount of time for a couple to wait before having children, completely
intertwining its finances, and making career-related and other sacrifices
for the benefit of the marriage as it evaluates the long-term marital suita247
bility of its relationship.
In summary, the rights and obligations, as well as the efficient, lowrisk exit process provided by level one, will encourage more couples to
obtain supportive and stabilizing legal protections for their relationships
while they determine if marriage is the best option for them. These features of level one will also provide fair and predictable results in the
event of dissolution, filter poorly suited relationships out of the institution of marriage before significant entanglement occurs, and filter wellsuited relationships into the institution. Finally, although it is not the
primary justification for the creation of level one, level one will likely
provide a long-term alternative to traditional marriage for some couples—particularly those who structure their relationships in a manner
that differs significantly from the traditional norms within most marriages—that allows these couples to enjoy a package of rights and protections
248
that is more useful and relevant to their relationships.
C. Remaining Levels: Gradual Marriage
Following level one, spousal rights and obligations would gradually
increase as the spouses ascend to higher marriage levels. This proposal
will not detail how each one of the hundreds of spousal rights and obligations accompanying marriage would fit within the proposed framework.
To obtain a stronger understanding of how a gradual marriage system
could work in practice, however, it is helpful to consider how some of the
most important spousal rights and obligations would function. This Sub-

246

Abrams et al., supra note 51, at 840.
Baker, supra note 30, at 616 (“Many couples do not have children before year
five, and even those that do have not had time to develop an entrenched gendered
division of paid and unpaid work.”); Paul, supra note 152, at 5 (explaining that
“more couples are delaying children for three, four, five years into their marriages”).
248
For a comprehensive proposal regarding the implementation of a legal
alternative to marriage, see generally Feinberg, supra note 7.
247
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section will first explore how a number of the essential rights and obligations accompanying marriage would operate under the proposed system.
It will then identify and discuss the process through which couples would
ascend among marriage levels under the proposed framework.
The package of rights and obligations arising at each level would be
aimed at reflecting the general characteristics of marriages that fall within that level under the default rules, protecting spouses, and supporting
marriages in relevant, useful ways. For example, the ability to collect Social Security and Medicare benefits based upon a spouse’s earnings record would arise at an advanced level, reflecting the types of expectations
and financial behaviors that develop over the years between spouses. This
would remain in place as the couple continues to ascend among the mar249
riage levels. Similarly, marriage-related penalties arising out of certain
entitlements and means-tested public benefits from which couples are
exempted at the trial level, and which are premised upon an assumption
that the spouses have formed a financial unit, would arise at an advanced
level, ideally after the couple had received the time and support necessary to become a financially stable marital unit. This would remain in
250
place at subsequent levels. Other important spousal rights and obligations that would not arise at the trial level, such as, for example, the right
to sponsor an immigrant spouse for a permanent visa, would also arise
after the trial level and remain in place throughout the remaining lev251
els. Moreover, to celebrate and encourage long-term marriages, various
mutually advantageous spousal tax-related and other benefits would be
252
provided to marriages as they reached advanced levels.
In addition to the rights and obligations that would appear for the
first time at an advanced marriage level and remain the same thereafter,
other types of rights and obligations would increase in scope or degree as
the spouses ascended among the marriage levels. This would be true for
many of the spousal rights and obligations that arise in the dissolution
context. To facilitate the gradual increase of these rights and obligations,
the proposed system would employ formulas. The use of such formulas
would add significantly greater consistency, predictability, and fairness in
253
the marital-dissolution context.

249

See supra note 61 and accompanying text for the current marriage-duration
requirement for collecting Social Security and Medicare benefits based upon a
spouse’s earnings record.
250
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
251
See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
252
Tax rights that are based on marriage currently arise at the time of the
marriage and do not change as the marriage increases in length. See IRS Pub. 501,
supra note 58, at 6 (explaining that a person is eligible to file a joint federal tax return
with his or her spouse as soon as he or she is recognized as married under state law).
253
See supra Section II.B for a discussion of the problematic aspects of the laws
currently governing marital dissolution.
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In the area of spousal support, for example, for marriages that have
advanced past level one, a formula should be implemented both for determining whether a spouse is entitled to support and for determining
254
the amount and duration of the support award. Under the spousalsupport formula, beginning at level two, there would be a strong presumption in favor of a spousal-support award if there was a specified degree of difference between the spouses’ incomes. The percentage of difference that would need to exist for a presumption of spousal support to
become applicable would lessen with each marriage level. This means
that the right to spousal support would become stronger at each level as
255
the marriage continued in duration. States would then determine how
the presumption could be rebutted. This may involve, for instance, a
showing that the earning capacity of the spouse seeking support was not
negatively affected by spousal decisions made for the well-being of the
family unit, or that there is a lack of need on the part of the spouse seek256
ing support. For individuals eligible for support, the support amount
would be determined by applying a specified percentage to the difference in spousal income, with the specified percentage increasing at each
level such that the amount of support a spouse is entitled to would also
257
grow at each level. The length of the award could similarly be presumptively determined by applying to the marriage duration a specified per258
centage that increases at each level. Under this or a similar type of formula, the right to spousal support would increase gradually as the couple
ascended through the marriage levels.
In the property realm, under the proposed system there would be a
presumption of joint property for property obtained at level two and eve254
See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
formulas that a handful of states have implemented in the spousal support context.
255
This is not the same as the approach taken for determining spousal-support
eligibility under the ALI proposal. Unlike the formula proposed here, under the ALI
proposal, the degree of spousal disparity needed for award eligibility would not
change depending on the length of the marriage. See supra note 120 and
accompanying text.
256
Kelly, supra note 88, at 264. “An entitlement to alimony related to the length
of the marriage provides a rough approximation of the continued effects of
partnering. Equalizing living standards accords equal value to care and market work,
and acknowledges the long lasting effects from financial merger.” Id.
257
This mirrors the part of the ALI proposal that addresses the method of
determining spousal-support amounts for eligible individuals. States apply a specified
percentage to the difference between the spouses’ incomes that increases with the
length of the marriage or period of primary caretaking responsibility. See supra note
123 and accompanying text.
258
This is not the same as the approach taken for determining spousal-support
duration under the ALI proposal. Unlike the formula proposed here, under the ALI
proposal, the percentage applied to the marriage duration in order to determine the
award length would not change depending on the duration of the marriage. See supra
note 124 and accompanying text.
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ry level thereafter. In addition, as the couple ascends through the levels,
an increasing percentage of each spouse’s separate property obtained
259
during level one would transmute to marital property until, upon
reaching one of the higher levels, all the property obtained by either
spouse during level one would become marital property. For the distribution of marital property, the presumptive minimum percentage to which
a significantly lower-earning spouse would be entitled would increase at
each level. The difference in income which would need to exist for a
spouse to be determined “significantly lower earning” would be set by
state law and would decrease at each level. A related approach would exist in the context of inheritance rights in situations where the decedent
spouse died intestate or disinherited his or her spouse. More specifically,
there would be a presumption of spousal-inheritance rights that arose after the trial level, and the percentage of the estate to which the surviving
spouse would presumptively be entitled would increase at each level.
Couples would ascend through the marriage levels primarily based
on the length of their marital relationship, with a one-time additional
one-level advancement occurring when a child is added to the relation260
ship for the first time. After the initial two years spent at level one, the
length of time that couples would spend at each level would gradually increase until the couple reached the final level. Before a couple ascended
to a new default level applicable to their relationship, they would receive
notice of the scheduled ascension and the ability to opt-out of that ascension. Although some couples would likely choose to remain at a lower
level indefinitely after determining that the package of more limited
rights and obligations best suited their particular relationship, it is anticipated that most couples would not opt-out of advancing to the next level
when the time came. People tend to remain within the default rules in
261
most contexts, as opposed to opting-out of such rules, something that
has been demonstrated in the marriage context by the dearth of individ262
uals who currently opt-out of the default rules governing marriage.
Notice of the specifics of the opt-out process would be sent to each
spouse approximately three months before the ascension to the next level was scheduled to occur. The notice would describe the rights and obli-

259

Transmutation of property is defined as “the change of the character of
property, either from separate to marital property or from marital to separate
property.” Divorce: How Property Ownership Changes, Lawyers.com, http://family-law.
lawyers.com/divorce/divorce-how-property-ownership-changes.html.
260
This one-time advancement would not apply to couples who already had
children upon entering the institution and consequently started by default at level
two.
261
Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2013) (“What is
striking and somewhat (though decreasingly) mysterious is that default rules
nonetheless have a large impact, because they tend to stick.”).
262
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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gations arising at the subsequent level, how those rights and obligations
would differ from those governing the couple’s current marriage level,
and the process for opting-out. It is likely that most couples choosing to
opt-out of a scheduled ascension would do so mutually, in which case
they would complete and sign a form indicating their intention to optout and submit the form to a local registration office. A spouse could also
unilaterally opt-out of the ascension by filling out the relevant form and
serving notice on the other spouse by a designated date before the
scheduled ascension, in which case the ascension would not occur.
Notably, the proposal set forth here differs greatly from various proposals that have been advanced regarding the use of renewable contracts
263
or similar mechanisms to govern marriage. In those proposals, a marriage would end by default after a set number of years unless the couple
264
took action to renew the contract. By contrast, under the system proposed here, inaction by the couple would mean not only that the couple
remains married, but also that the spouses would be taking on greater
265
rights and obligations within the marriage. Thus, under the proposed
system, momentum favors the continuation of the marriage, not its termination. Moreover, the decision that couples would be asked to make at

263

See, e.g., Atom Araullo, ‘Renewable Marriage’ Proposed, ABS-CBN News (Jan. 11,
2010), http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/lifestyle/01/11/10/renewable-marriage-proposed
(stating that in the Philippines, “[w]omen’s party-list group ‘Isa-Ako Babaeng Astig
Aasenso’ or 1-ABAA plans to propose in Congress a measure requiring couples to
renew their marriage after 10 years, or else their marriage would be null and void”);
Madeline Chambers, Glamorous Bavarian Wants Law to Allow 7-Year Itch, Reuters
(Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/21/us-germany-politicsmarriage-idUSHAR05782220070921 (describing German legislator Gabriele Pauli’s
proposal for a seven-year marriage that automatically terminates unless the couple
elects to renew); Collins, supra note 122, at 815–20 (setting forth a “term-of-years”
proposal in which couples in “starter marriages” would sign an agreement setting
forth the length of the marriage and subsequently would either allow the marriage to
expire or convert the marriage to a permanent marriage); Jennifer A. Drobac &
Antony Page, A Uniform Domestic Partnership Act: Marrying Business Partnership and
Family Law, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 349, 404–05 (2007) (proposing four types of domestic
partnerships, including a “provisional domestic partnership [that] lasts for only one
year and is renewable annually if the partners so choose”); Alex Leff, ‘Til 2013 Do Us
Part? Mexico Mulls 2-Year Marriage, Reuters (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/09/30/us-mexico-marriage-idUSTRE78S6TX20110930 (describing
a proposal by Mexico City lawmakers for the establishment of marriage contracts in
which the minimum term “would be for two years and could be renewed if the couple
stays happy”); Walter Wadlington, Domestic Relations 5 (successor ed. 1984)
(identifying that in 1971 and 1972, a bill was submitted to the Maryland state house
proposing “a contract for marriages” that would last for three years, with an option
for the couple to renew if they wished).
264
See id.
265
See supra notes 249–252, 259–262 and accompanying text.
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each level is not whether to stay married; it is merely whether to keep the
266
marriage at its current level or advance to a higher level.
A framework based upon ascension between marriage levels would
provide spouses with important opportunities throughout their marriage
to evaluate and discuss their relationship. Toward the end of each level,
spouses would need to decide whether there existed a mutual desire to
267
ascend to the next level. It is anticipated that this decision would lead
to an evaluation of the relationship by each spouse and a discussion between the spouses regarding the state of their marital relationship. Increased communication between the spouses regarding the state of the
marriage and any major concerns of either spouse with regard to the
268
marriage would be a positive development. It would allow the spouses
to better identify and understand each other’s needs and desires, and it
would give spouses the opportunity to correct or improve behaviors that
may be harming the marital relationship, thereby adding greater overall
stability to the marriage.
Moreover, the knowledge and understanding that one’s spouse will
be making an important decision about the future of the marriage at
some not-so-distant date may encourage individuals to work harder at
maintaining a mutually healthy and happy marital relationship. This
knowledge may also help spouses avoid taking the marriage for granted
and to assert ownership of the course of the marriage. In addition, in situations where one spouse does not desire to ascend to the next level, that
knowledge could help the other spouse to better manage his or her relationship-related expectations and to conduct himself or herself within
the relationship accordingly. Finally, the increased marital evaluation encouraged by the proposed framework may also more effectively facilitate
the termination of the type of unhealthy marriages discussed above.
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: THE
FURTHERANCE OF IMPORTANT GOALS AND THE POTENTIAL
CONCERNS
A. The Proposed Framework’s Advancement of Important Goals: A Brief
Summation
The proposed system will further each of the goals identified in Section III of an improved legal framework governing marriage. With regard
to furthering the goal of encouraging more cohabiting couples to obtain
legal rights and protections for their relationships, the supportive, help266

See supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 259–262 and accompanying text.
268
See generally Lee M. Shulman et al., I Do . . . Again: The Renewable
Marriage (2009) (suggesting couples schedule time every 30 days to “renew” their
marriage contract in order to maintain a more healthy relationship).
267
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ful rights and obligations, as well as the efficient, low-risk exit process accompanying the first marriage level, will encourage couples to obtain legal protections for their relationships while they determine whether marriage is suitable for them. The gradual nature of the spousal rights and
obligations accompanying marriage under the proposed system, in addition to the clear rules governing such rights and obligations, will also
help to encourage more couples to obtain legal protections for their relationships, as these reforms will make the consequences of entry into the
institution less risky, unpredictable, and inconsistent. The goal of filtering suitable relationships into the institution of marriage will be advanced by level one, which allows couples to experience to a significant
degree the cultural, societal, and legal expectations accompanying marriage while at the same time providing an efficient, low-risk, and straightforward exit process for couples who determine that marriage is not the
right choice for their relationships.
In terms of the goal of creating a more effective legal framework for
intact marriages, the rights and obligations granted to spouses at each
level will be tailored to marital relationships that have reached that particular level: there will no longer be a one-size-fits-all approach with regard to important spousal rights and obligations. This will result in significantly better support and protections for intact marriages. Moreover,
with regard to the goal of facilitating the continuation of healthy marriages and the termination of unhealthy marriages, the existence of ascending levels of marriage and the corresponding decisions couples will
need to make upon reaching the various levels will require couples to
evaluate and discuss their relationships. Ideally, increased communication and marital evaluation by spouses will result in the continuation of
low-conflict marriages, the termination of marriages that remain highconflict despite increased communication and evaluation, and more effective spousal efforts to improve the marriages that fall somewhere in
between. Moreover, the clear and predictable rights and obligations governing each level will more effectively facilitate the termination of unhealthy marriages, as there will be far less risk and uncertainty involved
for individuals in unhealthy marriages who wish to terminate their relationships.
Finally, the proposed legal framework will further the essential goal
of remedying the lack of predictability, consistency, and fairness that currently exists in the marital-dissolution context. Easily identifiable marriage levels, based upon the objective factors of length of the marriage
and presence of children within the marriage, and clear rights and responsibilities accompanying each level will provide much-needed predictability and consistency to judicial determinations of post-dissolution
rights and obligations. Moreover, the accompanying limits on judicial
discretion with regard to the determination of these post-dissolution
rights and obligations will further enhance consistency and predictability
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in this context, and will also increase fairness, as important rights and obligations will no longer be left to the whims and potential biases of the
particular judge hearing the case. Importantly, with regard to the essential goal of increasing fairness in the dissolution context, the gradual nature of the rights and obligations arising from marriage and the tailoring
of such rights and obligations to individual marriages based upon their
current level will provide for a dissolution framework that more effectively protects the spouses and their marital expectations. These attributes of
the proposed system will also allow parties to make better-informed decisions and will promote dissolution-related settlements, which will permit
more spouses to avoid costly, time-consuming, and emotionally draining
litigation.
B. Foreseeable Concerns with the Proposed Framework
The proposed legal framework, while offering significant improvements to the current legal framework governing marriage, may also raise
a number of concerns. One important concern is that the factors of marriage length and presence of children—the primary determinants of a
couple’s default marriage level and the accompanying package of legal
rights and obligations—cannot be used to accurately identify the conduct
and expectations of all married couples. While, as detailed above, it is
likely that the factors of marriage duration and presence of children as a
general matter represent the strongest overall objective indicators of
marital conduct and expectations, it is undoubtedly true that some couples’ marital conduct and expectations will differ from that which would
be predicted based on these factors. The proposed framework, however,
acknowledges this reality and seeks to address this concern in two distinct
manners.
First, under the proposed system, all couples are allowed to opt-out
of the default level applicable to their relationship if the spouses determine that the package of rights and obligations accompanying that level
does not reflect the conduct and expectations within their particular relationship. Thus, couples whose relationship characteristics differ from
those that would generally be expected based upon the length of the
marriage and the presence of children within the marriage have the ability to choose the marriage level that is best-suited to their relationship.
Second, many of the important spousal rights and obligations within the
269
proposed framework are structured as presumptions. Consequently,
courts would have the ability to depart from the presumptive results in
situations where such a departure is justified based upon the couple’s
marital conduct and expectations.

269

See supra Section IV.
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Another important potential concern with the proposed framework
involves the presumption against spousal support at level one. The concern is that the presumption could hurt dependent parties whose marriages dissolve at this level as well as their children. An initial response to
the concern regarding dependent spouses is that, because level one lasts
for only two years under the default rules and, in addition, will be understood by the parties as a trial period, it is unlikely that one spouse would
engage in conduct and decision-making during this level based on an
expectation of continued support from the other spouse. Another response to this concern is that the low-risk structure of level one is essential to encouraging couples who would otherwise cohabit to marry, and
thereby receive important rights and protections for their relationships
that they generally would not receive as cohabitants. Moreover, the
spousal-support rule at level one is structured as a presumption, as opposed to an absolute rule, so that in compelling circumstances a spouse
whose marriage dissolves during this level would be able to receive
270
spousal support. As for concerns regarding harmful effects on children
due to the presumption against spousal support at level one, it is important to note that under the proposed framework’s default rules, couples with children would not be governed by the rules of level one. Specifically, under the default rules, couples with existing children at the
time of marrying would automatically be placed at level two and couples
who did not have children at the time of marrying would undergo the
one-time, one-level ascension upon adding children to their relationship
271
for the first time.
Concerns may also be raised about the ability of couples to opt-out of
the default level applicable to their marriage. There may be a fear that, in
some cases, an individual with superior bargaining power will take advantage of his or her spouse when choosing the marriage level applicable
to the couple’s relationship. In a sense, this concern is similar to current
concerns regarding coercion and superior bargaining power in the context of pre-nuptial, post-nuptial, and separation agreements, in which
couples can opt-out of the default rules in favor of their own terms regarding important spousal rights and obligations such as property distri272
bution and spousal support. Under the proposed system, however, as
opposed to altering certain rights or obligations in any manner they
deem fit, couples would be choosing among levels, each consisting of
state-created packages of rights and benefits that are aimed at providing
rights and obligations that balance each other, as well as a floor of pro273
tection for the spouses. In addition, throughout the levels under the

270
271
272
273

See supra Section IV.B.
See supra notes 240–243, 260 and accompanying text.
See Abrams et al., supra note 51, at 856–57.
See supra Section IV.
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proposed system, many of the important spousal rights and obligations
would be structured as presumptions so that in appropriate circumstances a court would have the ability to protect a party with inferior bargain274
ing power regardless of the marriage level. Providing couples with the
autonomy to opt-out of default marriage levels that do not reflect the nature of their relationships also recognizes the reality that marriages differ
greatly. The ability to opt-out of default marriage levels is essential to effectively protect those relationships in which the spouses conduct themselves in ways that would not necessarily be predicted based upon the
length of the marriage or the presence of children within the marriage.
Other concerns may focus on a perceived encouragement of marriage termination under the proposed system. There may be concerns
that the ease of dissolution at level one, as well as the necessity for marriage evaluation at each level, will result in more individuals deciding to
end their marriages. With regard to the ease of dissolution at level one, a
low-risk and efficient dissolution framework is essential for encouraging
couples who would otherwise remain in non-marital cohabitations to try
marriage and thereby receive important protections for their relationships. In addition, if the experience in level one demonstrates to one or
both parties that the relationship is not suitable for marriage, then it is
best that the marriage is terminated before significant financial and familial intertwinement occurs, which is facilitated by the more efficient
dissolution procedure at this level. Moreover, it is simply more logical to
have an uncomplicated and efficient dissolution process at level one, as
the rights and obligations accompanying this level do not require sub275
stantial judicial involvement.
With regard to the related concern that the ongoing marriage evaluation parties will have to undertake to determine whether they would like
to opt-out of advancement to the next level will cause more marriages to
dissolve, it is important to note that the decision couples must make at
each level relates not to whether the parties wish to dissolve their relationship, but instead to whether they would like to remain at their cur276
rent level or advance to the next level. In addition, more frequent marriage evaluation may actually aid couples in remaining married by
encouraging them to communicate their feelings and concerns about the
marriage and to make adjustments accordingly. Moreover, even if marriage evaluation does cause some couples to determine that dissolution is
warranted for their relationship, marriage dissolution is not always a poor
choice. As discussed above, for individuals who are in unhealthy, unhap-

274
275
276

See supra Section IV.
See supra Section IV.B.
See supra notes 263–268 and accompanying text.
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py marriages, it is dissolution that will often be the best choice for the
277
spouses’ overall well-being and the well-being of their children.
CONCLUSION
The institution of marriage is at a crossroads. Marriage rates have
decreased significantly, non-marital cohabitation is at an all-time high,
and the divorce rate remains at a substantial 40–50%. The existing rules
governing both intact and dissolving marriages are deeply problematic.
The one-size-fits-all approach to intact marriages, in which spousal rights
and obligations arise all at once at the moment a couple is granted a
marriage license and generally do not change as the years of marriage
pass or as children are born to the marriage, insufficiently protects the
diverse spectrum of marriages in existence today. With regard to dissolving marriages, the substantial discretion granted to judges and the use of
the same broad default rules for determining post-dissolution spousal
rights and obligations, without regard to the length of the marriage or
the presence of children within the marriage, often leads to unfair, unpredictable, and inconsistent results. Perhaps as a result of the law’s
flawed approach to determining spousal rights and obligations, the institution of marriage has come to occupy an increasingly perilous place in
U.S. society.
The time has come to reconsider the structure of this important,
longstanding institution. Restructuring the legal framework governing
marriage so that spousal rights and obligations arise in a gradual, clear,
and relevant manner as couples ascend between distinct marriage levels
would provide a more logical, effective, and efficient legal framework for
marriage. The comprehensive reform to the legal framework governing
marriage proposed in this Article aims to revitalize the institution and to
make it a more useful, relevant option for couples across the United
States. While proposed change to any longstanding institution, especially
278
one that is often referred to as the bedrock of society, will always face
resistance, the risks of not acting to improve the institution of marriage
far outweigh the risks involved in updating its structure to better accommodate today’s relationships.

277

See supra notes 155–165 and accompanying text.
Mark Strasser, A Little Older, a Little Wiser, and Still Committed, 61 Rutgers L.
Rev. 507, 513–14 (2009) (referring to marriage as “the relationship that is viewed as
the bedrock of society”).
278

